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ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the word “spouse” in the European Union’s
Family Migration Directives in detail, focusing on the treatment of
married bi-national same-sex couples. Through these directives, the
European Union exercises significant authority over family-based
immigration and internal migration, expressly providing immigration
rights to the “spouses” of E.U. citizens and legal residents. However,
family law, including the familial status of “spouses” is governed by
individual E.U. member states. While a growing number of member
states authorize same-sex marriage, the majority still do not. The
E.U., therefore, must determine how to treat migrating couples who
are legal spouses in one member state, but not in another. This issue
echoes the choice the U.S. faced in 1996 and again in 2013: should
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federal law determine spousal status based on the law of the jurisdiction where a marriage was celebrated or where the couple resides, or
should it create its own independent federal definition? The two U.S.
approaches, a federal definition and a place-of-celebration choice-oflaw rule, may help Europeans as they develop their own answer. This
Article describes and rigorously applies the European Court of Justice’s five methods of directive interpretation (textual, systematic, historical, teleological, and comparative analyses) to the directives,
concluding that the best interpretations of the directives result in an
autonomous definition of “spouse” that includes same-sex spouses or
in a member-state-of-celebration choice-of-law rule. This exercise
provides some insight for European courts and scholars about the
various paths the European Court of Justice may take to interpret the
word “spouse” in the Family Migration Directives. It also provides an
introduction to European family-based immigration and an example
of the interpretation of directives generally, for judges, attorneys,
scholars, and students from outside of the E.U.
INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, many of the European Union’s (“E.U.” or
“Union”) member states have begun to authorize immigration of their
own citizens’ foreign same-sex partners.1 Decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“European Court of Justice” or “E.C.J.”)
make it clear that these countries must provide the same immigration
benefits to foreign partners of migrating citizens from other E.U. member
states.2 Yet it is unclear whether member states that generally refuse
immigration benefits to unmarried partners must recognize same-sex
couples, even if they are lawfully married.
1 SCOTT LONG ET AL., FAMILIES, UNVALUED: DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE
FATE OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S. LAW 152-72 (2006)
(describing how nine of the then fifteen E.U. member states granted immigration
options to same-sex couples by 2001, followed by Spain in 2005); Robert Wintemute,
Legal Comparison, Conclusions and Recommendations, in CONFRONTING
HOMOPHOBIA IN EUROPE: SOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 265, 269 (Luca
Trappolin et al. eds., 2012) (the U.K. has recognized same-sex partners for
immigration purposes since 1997); EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION,
GENDER IDENTITY AND SEX CHARACTERISTICS IN THE EU: COMPARATIVE LEGAL
ANALYSIS – 2015 UPDATE 81–85 (2015), http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/
lgbti-comparative-legal-update-2015 [hereinafter F.R.A. REPORT] (at least nineteen
of the current twenty-eight E.U. member states provide benefits for same-sex spouses
and/or partners).
2 Case C-59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. I-01283, ¶ 30 (requiring member
states that grant family reunification to non-married partners of their own nationals to
extend reunification to the partners of workers from other E.U. member states).
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Two important E.U. directives govern the immigration rights of
spouses and partners of E.U. citizens and legal residents: (1) the “Family
Reunification Directive,” Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family
reunification, and (2) the “Citizens Directive,” Directive 2004/38/EC on
the right of citizens of the union and their family members to move and
reside freely within the territory of the member states.3 These two directives (collectively, “Family Migration Directives”) appear to further the
rights of same-sex foreign spouses by expressly providing a right of entry
and residence to the “spouses” of eligible E.U. citizens in all E.U. member states and to the “spouses” of legal residents in most member states.4
Yet the term “spouse” here is less clear than it initially appears.
In the E.U., family law is primarily governed by member states, and the
states’ approaches to same-sex couples range from full marriage equality,
to registered or de facto partnership options, to constitutional bans on
3 Both Directives apply to all E.U. member states with the exceptions of Denmark,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom, which are not covered directly by the Family
Reunification Directive, having opted out under a reservation to the underlying treaty
provisions. See Council Directive 2003/86/EC, On the Right to Family Reunification,
recitals 17, 18, 2003 O.J. (L 251/12) (EC) [hereinafter Family Reunification Directive];
Council Directive 2004/38/EC, art 2., On the Right of Citizens of the Union and their
Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of Member States,
2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 (EC) [hereinafter Citizens Directive]. Two additional directives
expressly adopt the definition of “family member” in the Family Reunification
Directive for purposes of defining the benefits of dependents of long-term residents
already in member states and of dependents of “blue card” workers. See Council
Directive 2003/109/EC, art. 2, Concerning the Status of Third-Country Nationals who
are Long-Term Residents, 2004 O.J. (L 16) [hereinafter Long-Term Residents
Directive]; Council Directive 2009/50/EC, art. 2(f), On the Conditions of Entry and
Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Highly Qualified
Employment, 2009 O.J. (L 155). A fifth directive defines and protects the family
members of refugees and asylees in the E.U. See Council Directive 2011/95/EU,
recital 49, On Standards for the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless
Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status for
Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the
Protection Granted (Recast), 2011 O.J. (L 337/9) 12 [hereinafter Qualification
Directive]. While analysis of the recast Qualification Directive and its predecessor,
Council Directive 2004/83/EC (which still applies to Ireland and the United
Kingdom), is generally beyond the scope of this Article, it will be referenced as
appropriate. See Council Directive 2004/83/EC, art. 2, On Minimum Standards for
the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as
Refugees or as Persons who Otherwise Need International Protection and the
Content of the Protection Granted, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 14-15. Hopefully, future
scholarship will examine it in depth and compare it to the Family Migration
Directives. Under European Union law, a directive is binding legislation, but it is
normally set out in lesser detail than E.U. “regulations,” since it is intended to be
implemented through member state legislation. See infra Part I.
4 See Citizens Directive & Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3.
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same-sex marriage recognition.5 Because most member states have not
yet recognized same-sex marriage, the meaning of the term “spouse” in
E.U. law is controversial.
The current E.U. questions regarding same-sex spouses echo those
faced by U.S. officials back in 2013, when the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down the federal definition of “spouse” in the Defense of Marriage Act
(“D.O.M.A.”).6 Under federal law, should the legal status of same-sex
spouses be determined by the law of the state where the marriage was
celebrated or the law of the state where the couple resides? Or should it
be determined by a new independent federal definition?7 In the U.S.,
the Obama administration adopted a place-of-celebration choice-of-law
rule for immigration and other federal purposes.8
Although the E.C.J. has not definitively ruled on the meaning of
“spouse” under the Family Migration Directives, legal scholars have
offered a wide range of views. Some scholars argue that married, samesex couples may not qualify as “spouses,” but only as “registered partners” or “unmarried partners,” alternative categories generally leaving
immigration eligibility up to each host member state.9 Other scholars
5 For example, Spain recognizes marriage equality; Germany recognizes registered
life partnerships; Sweden recognizes de facto relationships; and Bulgaria has adopted
a constitutional provision barring recognition of same-sex marriages. See infra Part
IV(D)(1). Some E.U. member states offer more than one form of recognition. See
KEES WAALDIJK, MORE OR LESS TOGETHER: LEVELS OF LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MARRIAGE, COHABITATION AND REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP FOR DIFFERENT-SEX
AND SAME-SEX PARTNERS 42 (Kees Waaldijk ed., 2004), https://openaccess.leiden
univ.nl/handle/1887/12585.
6 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
7 See Koen Lenaerts, Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the
European Court of Justice, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1338, 1356 (2010) (echoing these
three choices in the E.U. context as the member-state-of-origin principle based on the
law of the place-of-celebration, the host member state principle, and an independent
E.U. definition of “spouse”); Scott C. Titshaw, Revisiting the Meaning of Marriage:
Immigration for Same-Sex Spouses in a Post-Windsor World, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 167, 168 (2013). As described below, the E.U. actually has one additional
option: to focus on a person’s state of nationality. Of course, there is no meaningful
American concept of state citizenship or nationality apart from residence and
domicile. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the state wherein they reside.”).
8 See Titshaw, supra note 7, at 169. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a
constitutional right to marriage equality for same-sex couples, confirming this
administrative definition and eliminating the possibility that any future Congress or
administration could return to an anti-gay federal definition of marriage. Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
9 See ELSPETH GUILD, STEVE PEERS & JONATHAN TOMKIN, THE EU CITIZENS
DIRECTIVE: A COMMENTARY 35-36 (2014). Guild, Peers, and Tomkin base their
argument on the apparent intent of some E.U. lawmakers that the term “spouse”
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argue that same-sex spouses qualify as “spouses” generally, or at least if
the marriage is recognized in their E.U. “home state.”10 Meanwhile,
Koen Lenaerts, the current Vice President of the E.C.J. has opined extrajudicially that the E.C.J. should “proceed on a case-by-case basis” to balance the E.U.’s fundamental goal of free movement against any “overriding reasons of general interest” that opposing member states can
muster.11 Some of these views are based on only partial analyses, while
others focus on substantive human rights claims. None of these opinions,
however, have systematically examined the meaning of “spouse” in the
Family Migration Directives together as this Article attempts to do.
The main purpose of this Article is twofold: first, it aims to clarify the
specific family-based immigration rights of legally married same-sex
spouses and their children (still unaddressed by the E.C.J.) by interpreting the Family Migration Directives, which ultimately support either a
federal definition inclusive of same-sex “spouse[s]” or a “member-stateof-celebration” choice-of-law rule; and second, in the process, it seeks to
provide a description and detailed example of how to rigorously apply the
E.C.J.’s methods of directive interpretation.
The Article is divided into six parts. Following this introduction, Part I
provides a brief overview of the E.U. Family Migration Directives and
their treatment of spouses and partners. Part II compares the E.U. and
U.S. approaches to family-based immigration, noting the flexibility and
limitations of the E.U. approach before briefly describing the U.S. experiwould not apply to same-sex couples. See id.; see also HELEN TONER, PARTNERSHIP
RIGHTS, FREE MOVEMENT, AND EU LAW 76-78 (2004) (stating that E.U. legislation
does not yet require member state immigration rights for any partner “other than
opposite-sex spouses,” but arguing in favor of such recognition).
10 See Jessica Guth, When is a Partner not a Partner?: Conceptualisations of
‘Family’ in EU Free Movement Law, 33 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 193, 201 (2011)
(generally arguing the E.U. should recognize “same-sex married partners” as
“spouse[s]” as obligated by European antidiscrimination requirements); Allison R.
O’Neill, Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in the European Community: The
European Court of Justice’s Ability to Dictate Social Policy, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
199, 210-11, 215 (2004) (arguing that the E.C.J. may be required to reconsider its
refusal to recognize same-sex couples as “spouse(s)” in light of actual implementation
of marriage equality for those couples in E.U. member states); Jorrit Rijpma &
Nelleke Koffeman, Chapter 20 - Free Movement Rights for Same-Sex Couples Under
EU Law: What Role to Play for the CJEU?, in SAME-SEX COUPLES BEFORE
NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 455, 471-72, 489
(Daniele Gallo et al. eds., 2014) (arguing for “mutual recognition” coverage of any
marriage valid in the relevant E.U. “home state”); Alina Tryfonidou, Same-Sex
Marriage: The EU is Lagging Behind, EU LAW ANALYSIS: EXPERT INSIGHT INTO EU
LAW DEVELOPMENTS (June 29, 2015), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/06/
same-sex-marriage-eu-is-lagging-behind.html (arguing that host member states should
treat as “spouses” the foreign same-sex spouses of E.U. citizens).
11 Lenaerts, supra note 7, at 1360-61.
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ence with both a federal definition of marriage and a place-of-celebration
choice-of-law rule. Part III summarizes the five accepted methods for
interpreting E.U. directives: textual, systematic, historical, teleological
and comparative analyses. Part IV then rigorously applies those methods
to analyze the Family Migration Directives. Finally, this Article suggests
some conclusions regarding the best interpretation of the directives, highlighting some broader differences between the E.U. and U.S. approaches
to the recognition of family for immigration purposes.
Ultimately, this academic analysis not only seeks to provide insight for
E.U. decision-makers on the various paths they can take to interpret the
word “spouse” in the directives, but also aims to encourage same-sex
married couples in the E.U. to more closely examine the arguments
accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor.12 Married same-sex couples in the E.U., like their counterparts under the former D.O.M.A. regime in the U.S., arguably enjoy only second-class
marital status: they are recognized as legal spouses under the laws of
some member states but not yet under E.U. law.13
I. OVERVIEW OF THE E.U. FAMILY MIGRATION DIRECTIVES, THEIR
IMPLEMENTATION, AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
AVAILABLE TO SPOUSES AND OTHER COUPLES
One central theme of the European Union order is its longstanding
effort to create a united, borderless geographic area, characterized by
free movement without internal border controls. Because a significant
number of people living and moving within Europe are “third-country
national” immigrants from outside of the Union,14 there have been
12

See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
See Alina Tryfonidou, EU Free Movement Law and the Legal Recognition of
Same-Sex Relationships: The Case for Mutual Recognition, in RIGHTS ON THE MOVE –
RAINBOW FAMILIES IN EUROPE 137, 148-49 (Carlo Casonato & Alexander Schuster
eds., 2014) (describing the two-tiered result of the E.U. status quo, where some
marriages are valid both under national and E.U. law while others are valid only
nationally).
14 “Third-country national” means any person who is not an E.U. citizen, i.e., any
person not a national of an E.U. member state. Family Reunification Directive, supra
note 3, art. 2(a); Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, art. 17(1), Sept. 22, 2003, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3. Where U.S. lawyers would
say “immigrant” and “immigration,” E.U. legal experts tend to use the terms “thirdcountry national” and “migration.” This is because, unlike the U.S., the E.U. allows
restrictions on internal European migration, and its member states generally treat
foreign nationals differently depending on whether they are citizens of an E.U.
member state or of another country. “Migration law” thus encompasses intra-E.U.
migration as well as immigration from outside the Union, and, in the context of a
given member state, it distinguishes between that member state’s nationals, foreign
E.U. citizens, and foreign third-country nationals.
13
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increasing efforts to harmonize E.U. immigration policy,15 particularly in
the area of family-based immigration.16
Family-based immigration has been the most common form of immigration, and policies in this area have important implications for E.U.
citizen and resident mobility.17 The E.C.J. and other European institutions have long recognized that the right to “free movement” has little
practical meaning for someone who must leave behind a spouse and children if she moves to another country.18
Both Family Migration Directives therefore provide particular immigration benefits to third-country national spouses in order to protect family life and to ensure meaningful migration rights for E.U. citizens and
residents.19 Because primary E.U. law guarantees Union citizens a fundamental right to free movement, their third-country national spouses could
claim basic derivative migration rights, even without the detailed Citizens
Directive, which will be discussed below.20 The spouses of legal residents
(or non-citizens) of the E.U., however, do not have a comparable constitutional claim, but the Family Reunification Directive and Long-Term
Residents Directive provide them with other family unity and migration
rights.21
15

This goal was most recently clarified in late 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty came
into effect, mandating a common E.U. immigration policy. Consolidated Version of
the Treaty of Lisbon art. 63, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 340/01) 61.
16 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
art. 79(2)(a), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326/49) 77 [hereinafter T.F.E.U.]. The Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union expressly provides the Parliament and
Council “shall adopt measures” regarding “entry and residence . . . for the purpose of
family reunification.”
17 Residence Permit Statistics, EUROSTAT, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Residence_permits_statistics#Residence_permits_by_reason
(last visited Oct. 18, 2015) (showing that family-based immigration is the leading
reason for immigration in most E.U. member states); Commission Proposal for a
Council Directive on the Right to Family Reunification, ¶ 5.1 COM (1999) 638 Final
(Dec. 1, 1999) (describing family reunification as absolutely necessary to “the exercise
of free movement in objective conditions of freedom and dignity”) [hereinafter
Council’s Family Reunification Proposal].
18 See Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, 2002 E.C.R. I06279, ¶ 38. See also Kees Waaldijk, The Right to Relate: A Lecture on the Importance
of “Orientation” in Comparative Sexual Orientation Law, 24 DUKE J. OF COMP. &
INT’L L. 161, 197 (2013) (citing numerous scholars who have made this point); infra
Part IV(C).
19 The Family Reunification Directive, as incorporated in the Long-Term
Residents Directive, protects the free movement rights of long-term residents. See
Long-Term Residents Directive, supra note 3, art. 16.
20 See generally EU IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW COMMENTARY 201 (Kai
Hailbronner & Daniel Thym eds., 2d ed. 2015).
21 See Long-Term Residents Directive, supra note 3, art. 16 (describing the
incorporation of the Family Reunification Directive in the Long-Term Residents
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Despite the recognized need for harmonization, efforts to establish
E.U. immigration rules have only been partially successful. In the context of family-based immigration in particular, the Union’s current system
could be described as a hybrid of minimum Union standards and twentyeight different member state immigration regimes.22
While E.U. institutions do not yet claim exclusive authority over immigration, various treaties, E.C.J. decisions, and other sources of European
law set the parameters within which E.U. member states regulate familybased immigration. Fortunately, much of this sprawling body of law has
been codified in the Family Migration Directives (as well as in the LongTerm Residents Directive and the Qualification Directive for refugees).23
As discussed below in detail, the Family Reunification Directive sets the
baseline for the migration of family members of third-country national
legal residents in E.U. member states, while the Citizens Directive provides a more detailed framework for migration by E.U. citizens and their
family members to other member states.
A. The Family Reunification Directive
The Family Reunification Directive provides minimum rights for thirdcountry-national spouses and minor children of legal residents with residence permits valid for a year or longer in an E.U. member state.24 This
directive was conceived as a step toward the “fair treatment” of legal
immigrants, granting them “rights and obligations comparable to those of
citizens of the European Union.”25 It does not establish equal migration
Directive). E.U. scholars often use the term “constitutional” to describe the primary
E.U. law comprised of treaties and general principles as opposed to secondary E.U.
law such as regulations and directives. See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts & José A. GutiérrezFons, The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law, 47
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1629 (2010). While third-country nationals do not enjoy a
direct right to free movement under E.U. treaties, they can still claim the benefit of
constitutional human rights guarantees under E.U. law. EU IMMIGRATION AND
ASYLUM LAW COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 201.
22 See infra Part I(C).
23 PETER BOELES ET AL., EUROPEAN MIGRATION LAW 180 (2d ed. 2009).
24 See Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, art. 3(1). The directive does
not directly apply to Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. See id. recitals 1718. Since the E.U. attaches numerous rights to E.U. citizenship status, the term
“third-country national” is commonly used to designate non-E.U.-citizens. This
Article will use that term “third-country national” and “non-E.U.-citizen”
interchangeably. It also sometimes uses “foreign” or “foreign national” when
describing the treatment of non-citizens from a member state perspective or
comparing U.S. immigration law, where there is no meaningful distinction regarding
“second” and “third” countries. See id. recital 4.
25 Id. recital 3 (citing Conclusions of the Council meeting in Tempere on 15 and 16
October 1999). This legal resident “fairness” concept was later adapted at the treaty
level of E.U. law in the T.F.E.U., supra note 16, and the ideal of equalization of the
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rights for third-country national legal residents, however, as it defers to
individual member states’ regulatory power over waiting periods,26 integration requirements,27 and other restrictions. But the directive has generally had a liberalizing and harmonizing effect.28
The directive requires member states to authorize the entry and residence of qualifying family members of legal resident “sponsors” and also
to authorize their employment, enrollment in educational institutions,
and access to vocational guidance.29 After five years, generally the family
members are entitled to residence permits, independent of their original
sponsors.30 The directive also establishes procedural, temporal, and evidentiary parameters for decisions regarding family reunification.31
The Family Reunification Directive enumerates three categories of
“family members,” each of which is governed by a varying degree of
member state discretion, as described in more detail in Subpart IV(A)(1)
below. With the possible exception of the term “spouse,” the classification scheme and governing rules are clear and detailed, but one large
optional category still leaves member states with a significant amount of
discretion.32
The first category of family members consists of the sponsor’s “spouse”
and the minor children of the sponsor or spouse.33 By and large, member
states are required to recognize the qualifying person’s entitlement to
family reunification with all of the rights listed above, including access to
employment and education.34
treatment of legal residents and citizens was reiterated in the Stockholm Programme,
2009 O.J. (C115/30), ¶ 6.1.4. See also BOELES ET AL., supra note 23, at 180
(referencing the failure of the final version of the directive to place third-country
nationals in a position comparable to E.U. citizens).
26 The directive only requires a member state to authorize family reunification of
residents who have stayed in their territory for more than two years. Family
Reunification Directive, supra note 3, art. 8.
27 Id. art. 7(2).
28 “The [d]irective had a varied impact although it led overall to greater
harmonization. Of the 13 countries that had transposed [the directive into member
state law] by the end of 2006, the outcome was more liberalization in 8 states, more
restrictions in 3 and a mixed effect in the remainder.” Helena Wray et al., A Family
Resemblance?: The Regulation of Marriage Migration in Europe, 16 EUROPEAN J.
MIGRATION & L. 209, 218 (2014).
29 Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, arts. 4, 14.
30 Id. art. 15.
31 Id. arts. 5-8.
32 Id. arts. 4(2)-(3).
33 Id. art. 4(1) (requiring that “Member States shall authorize the entry and
residence of . . . the sponsor’s spouse” as well as defined minor children “of the
sponsor and of his/her spouse”) (emphasis added).
34 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (i.e. entry, residence, education,
employment, etc.).
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The second category consists of underage spouses, spouses of underage
sponsors, parents, grandparents, certain dependent adult children, registered partners, unmarried partners with whom the sponsor is in “a duly
attested stable long-term relationship,” and the partner’s qualifying children.35 The second group also includes the sponsor’s children with a second polygamous spouse.36 Unlike the first group and its Union-wide
recognition, the directive expressly allows member states to decide
whether to “authorize family reunification . . . of unmarried or registered
partners” and other family members in this category.37
The third category consists of spouses in polygamous marriages, and
the directive prohibits their recognition under certain circumstances.38
Specifically, the directive provides that member states “shall not authorize the family reunification of a further spouse” where “the sponsor
already has a spouse living with him in . . . the Member State.”39
B. The Citizens Directive
The Citizens Directive generally recognizes that E.U. citizenship “confers on every citizen . . . a primary and individual right to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States,” “an area without internal frontiers.”40 To respect such a right and also maintain family unity,
the Citizens Directive requires member states to allow the migration of
the citizens’ family members regardless of their nationality, generally
treating them the same as E.U. citizens.41
The directive recognizes the right of Union citizens and their “family
members” to enter any member state, generally without any formal
requirements for the first three months.42 If employed, self-employed,
studying, or otherwise not a burden on the social assistance or healthcare
system of the host country, a citizen and her family member can reside in
any member state for a longer term,43 with the possibility of acquiring the
right to permanent residence.44 This directive also provides continuing
35

Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, art. 4(3).
Id. art. 4(4) (“By way of derogation from paragraph 1(c), Member States may
limit the family reunification of minor children of a further spouse and the sponsor.”).
37 See, e.g., id. art. 4(3) (stating that “Member [S]tates may . . . authorize the entry
and residence . . . of the unmarried partner . . . with whom the sponsor is in a duly
attested stable long-term relationship”) (emphasis added).
38 Id. arts. 4(4)-4(5).
39 Id. art. 4(4) (emphasis added).
40 Citizens Directive, supra note 3, recitals 1-2.
41 Wray et al., supra note 28, at 220.
42
Citizens Directive, supra note 3, arts. 5-6.
43 Id. art. 7.
44 Id. arts. 9-11, 16.
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residence rights to spouses and partners, even if the sponsoring Union
citizen dies or terminates the relationship.45
The Citizens Directive confers more rights to a broader group of family
members than does the Family Reunification Directive. The Citizens
Directive sets forth a non-comprehensive categorization scheme, focusing
solely on prescribing positive rights and omitting any references to relatives whom member states “may” allow to immigrate. It also does not
expressly prohibit reunification for polygamous spouses or any other
group.
Like in the Family Reunification Directive, the term “family member”
in the Citizens Directive covers “spouse[s]” and minor children.46 In
addition, the directive expressly defines “family member” to include a
citizen’s registered partner “if the host Member State treats registered
partnerships as equivalent to marriage.”47 “Family members” also
include other dependent relatives, who are “direct descendants” (e.g.,
adult children, grandchildren or great grandchildren) or “direct relatives
in the ascending line” (e.g., parents and grandparents).48 The Citizens
Directive covers these relatives and the children of qualifying partners
and spouses to the same extent as those of E.U. citizens.49
Even for “persons who are not included in the definition of family
members under [the Citizens] Directive,” it charges member states with
the duty to examine their “situation . . . in order to decide whether entry
and residence could be granted,” in the interest of “unity of the family in
a broader sense.”50 The directive states that a “Member State shall, in
accordance with its national legislation, facilitate entry and residence of
. . . the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship,
duly attested,” as well as “any other family members” who have been
“dependents or members of the household of the Union citizen.”51 This
duty to “facilitate” migration could perhaps prompt some member states
to extend their national laws to cover same-sex partners and spouses.52
The Citizens Directive is triggered only when an E.U. citizen crosses
member state borders; it does not apply to “purely internal” situations,
where a member state regulates third-country national family members of
45

Id. arts. 12-13.
Id. arts. 2(2)(a)-(c).
47 Id. art. 2(2)(b).
48 Id. arts. 2(2)(c)-(d).
49 Id. arts. 2(2)(a)-(d).
50 Id. recital 6.
51 Id. art. 3(2) (emphasis added).
52 “Facilitation” arguably prohibits them from refusing long-term stable partners
merely because they are of the same-sex, or from adopting blanket policies refusing
unmarried partners, but this requirement is not directly enforceable by independent
lawsuits against member states who are not complying. Rijpma & Koffeman, supra
note 10, at 474-75 (citing Case C-83/11, Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. Rahman,
2012 E.C.R. ¶¶ 21, 24).
46
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its own non-migrating citizens.53 This limited scope can result in reverse
discrimination against the families of the host state’s own citizens in comparison to families of immigrants from other E.U. member states.54
C. Implementation of the Family Migration Directives
Member states have implemented the Family Migration Directives in a
number of different ways. While sixteen E.U. member states recognize
same-sex marriages or registered partnerships domestically, not all of
them provide equal family reunification rights to same- and different-sex
partners.55 Other countries allow the admission of same-sex partners but
only on a narrower basis.56 And several E.U. member states do not seem
to “facilitate” the migration of same-sex couples at all, under either
directive.57
As an initial matter, a number of member states have avoided the
threshold issue of whether married same-sex couples are recognized as
“spouses” under the directives. Since E.U. law generally requires member states to treat migrant citizens from other member states as favorably
as their own nationals, those states that grant immigration rights to the
registered or de facto partners of their own citizens must also recognize
53 BOELES ET AL., supra note 23, at 75; Peter Van Elsuwege & Dimitry Kochenov,
On the Limits of Judicial Intervention: EU Citizenship and Family Reunification
Rights, 13 EUROPEAN J. MIGRATION & L. 443, 443 (2011). American lawyers may
find it conceptually useful to compare this to federal reliance on “interstate
commerce” for jurisdiction, but the E.U. has not yet developed such a highly
expansive understanding of its jurisdiction.
54 EU IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 202.
55 Kees Waaldijk, Legal Family Formats for (Same-Sex) Couples, in RIGHTS ON
THE MOVE – RAINBOW FAMILIES IN EUROPE 121, 123 (Carlo Casonato & Alexander
Schuster eds., 2014) (listing the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Portugal,
Denmark, France, Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Slovenia,
Hungary, Austria, Ireland, and much of the United Kingdom). An article from 2014
counted eight member states providing fully equal family reunification rights in the
European Economic Area (E.E.A.). Wray et al., supra note 28, at 238 (adding the
caveat that other member states may provide protections under the category of
unregistered cohabiting partners). There now are presumably at least nine, since
Luxembourg began recognizing same-sex marriage in January 2015. See Kees
Waaldijk, Great Diversity and Some Equality: Non-Marital Legal Family Formats for
Same-Sex Couples in Europe, 1 GENIUS 42, 44 (2014). The E.U.’s Fundamental
Rights Agency reports that seventeen member states do not treat same-sex spouses as
“legal spouses” under the Family Reunification Directive. F.R.A. REPORT, supra note
1, at 88.
56 Wray et al., supra note 28, at 238 (citing Italy, which only permits the
immigration of same-sex legal spouses of E.U. citizens with marriages in an E.U.
member state, and France, which provided only a second-class status at the time).
57 See F.R.A. REPORT, supra note 1, at 81, 90-91.
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the partners of immigrating citizens from other member states.58 Given
this rule, the issue of whether a married person is categorized as a
“spouse,” a “registered partner,” or an “unmarried partner in a durable
relationship” seems beside the point, as long as the person is granted
entry and residence. Unless states begin to require different forms of
proof for different relationship types (for instance, where a “durable relationship” requires some showing of longevity while a marriage merely
requires evidence of legal status), there may be no practical incentive for
lawyers, courts, or scholars to classify the couple with any degree of
precision.
Nevertheless, other E.U. member states may interpret the term
“spouse” differently in the two Family Migration Directives, leading to
unequal treatment. For example, Italy grants entry and residence to foreign same-sex spouses of E.U. citizens under the Citizens Directive, but it
has not announced a parallel policy for same-sex spouses of legal
residents under the Family Reunification Directive.59 This inconsistency
does not stem from a difference in domestic Italian law, which generally
refuses immigration recognition to same-sex spouses of its own citizens or
residents,60 but from Italy’s implementation of European law. (This
results in better treatment of the spouses of immigrants from other E.U.
countries than of the spouses of its own citizens.) The Italian decision to
recognize same-sex spouses under the Citizens Directive seemed to focus
more on the fundamental European rights to family and family formation, than on a careful interpretation of the directive.61 This action could
58

See Robert Wintemute, Homophobia and United Kingdom Law: Only a Few
Gaps Left to Close?, in CONFRONTING HOMOPHOBIA IN EUROPE: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 233, 250 (Luca Trappolin, Alessandro Gasparini & Robert Wintemute
eds., 2012) (citing Article 18 of the T.F.E.U. and Case C-59/85, Netherlands v. Reed,
1986 E.C.R. I-01283, for the proposition that an E.U. member state must grant
equally favorable treatment in its immigration law to citizens of other member states
as to its own citizens, even if that treatment exceeds the minimum requirements of the
Citizens Directive). See also Rijpma & Koffeman, supra note 10, at 486 (arguing that
E.U. non-discrimination rules, on the bases of sex and sexual orientation, require
member states to recognize same-sex couples to the extent that they elect to recognize
different-sex couples).
59 See Trib. Reggio Emilia, sez. un.13 febbraio 2012, n. 1401/2011 2012; Circulare n.
8996, Unione fra persone dello stesso sesso. Titolo di soggionro ai sensi del D. Lgs. 30/
2007 (Oct. 26, 2012) (on file with author); Marco Gestri, 23 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L.
ONLINE 553, 556 (2013) (reviewing SAME-SEX COUPLES BEFORE NATIONAL,
SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS (Daniele Gallo et al. eds.,
2014)); F.R.A. REPORT, supra note 1, at 89.
60 See Circulare n. 8996, supra note 59. See also Wintemute, supra note 58, at 271
(indicating that Italy only recognizes same-sex couples for immigration purposes
when required by E.U. law).
61 See Decision Trib. Reggio Emilia, supra note 59, at 13 febbraio 2012, prima
sezione, n. 1401/2011.
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indicate that Italy may yet extend recognition to same-sex spouses of
residents under the Family Reunification Directive as well.
D. Alternative Approaches for Same-Sex Spouses and Partners
Scholars as well as representatives of the European Commission
(“Commission”) have suggested that same-sex spouses should be treated
not as spouses, but as registered partners under one or both of the Family
Migration Directives — a position that is widely held.62 While this alternative approach could serve as a practical fallback for some same-sex
spouses of E.U. citizens moving to member states that recognize registered partnerships,63 unfortunately, it is less helpful to the spouses of
legal residents, and to those in member states that do not recognize such
partnerships.
According to the widely held view, if same-sex married couples are not
treated as “spouses” for purposes of the directives, their formal marriage
certainly should qualify as a registration scheme that is “equivalent to
marriage” in the state of formalization.64 Therefore, Article 2(2)(b) of
the Citizens Directive requires member states to authorize entry and residence of an E.U. citizen’s same-sex spouse as a “registered partner” if the
host country’s national laws also recognize same-sex marriages or marriage “equivalent” partnerships.65 In that case, the member state must
also allow immigration of the foreign national’s dependent children,
grandchildren, parents, and grandparents under Article 2(2)(c)-(d).66
Even host member states that do not recognize or treat registered partnerships as the equivalent of marriages, however, are still required to
“facilitate entry and residence” for the partners of E.U. citizens bound
under the registration schemes of other jurisdictions.67
Yet this duty to “facilitate” gives these spouses something less than an
enforceable “right.”68 Indeed, some member states seem to have ignored
any such command, for spouses of E.U. citizens as well as non-citizen
62

See supra note 9 and accompanying text. See also infra Part IV(B)(4).
The advantage to this argument is the mandatory recognition of such registered
partners in contrast to reliance on the general fallback provision that member states
“facilitate” migration for families falling outside the directive’s definition of “Family
Member.”
64 See supra note 62.
65 Citizens Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(2)(b).
66 Id. arts. 2(2)(c)-(d).
67 Id. art. 3(2).
68 See supra Part I(B) (that member states “shall . . . facilitate” does not directly
confer an identifiable right to an immigrant). Member states are limited, however, by
the European Convention of Human Rights and the E.U. Charter, which generally
require them to recognize same-sex partners on the same terms as they recognize
unmarried different-sex partners.
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residents.69 Furthermore, it is doubtful that affected individuals could
directly challenge a member state’s failure to “facilitate.”70
Unlike the Citizens Directive, the Family Reunification Directive guarantees no legal rights to married same-sex couples if they do not qualify
as “spouses.” The Family Reunification Directive merely states that
“Member States may . . . authorise . . . entry and residence” for partners
and their dependent children.71 Given these gaps and weaknesses, this
alternative approach is inadequate for same-sex spouses of legal residents
and of E.U. citizens living in states that do not recognize “equivalent
partnerships.”
II. THE E.U. - U.S. COMPARISON
A comparison of the family-based immigration systems of the United
States and the European Union is fitting here, given the similarities
between the two systems. The Family Migration Directives include
“spouse[s]” among the most privileged category of “nuclear family” who
must be granted entry and residency.72 Yet neither directive defines the
term “spouse.” This ambiguity in E.U. immigration law parallels that in
U.S. immigration statutes and regulations, which also use the term
“spouse” extensively without definition.73 Additionally, both the E.U.
and the U.S. reflect the tensions in a two-tiered system, in which familybased immigration is largely governed at the federal or Union level,74 but
family law is governed at the state or member state level.75 The member
69

See supra Part I(C); F.R.A. REPORT, supra note 1, at 81, 88.
See TONER, supra note 9, at 67 (doubting this language would easily be
construed to grant directly effective rights).
71 Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, art. 4(3).
72 Id. recital 9.
73 See generally Scott Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and
Their Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 537, 541 (2010).
74 Much like the U.S. commerce clause power examined in early Supreme Court
cases, E.U. authority over immigration may be limited to cases where immigrants
move from one E.U. member state to another. No Union jurisdiction has yet been
recognized for dealing with the entirely “internal situations” of E.U. citizens who only
remain within their own member state. This has resulted in reverse discrimination by
member states against their own citizens in some cases. See Alina Tryfonidou, EU
Free Movement Law and the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: The Case
for Mutual Recognition, in RIGHTS ON THE MOVE – RAINBOW FAMILIES IN EUROPE
137, 174 (Carlo Casonato & Alexander Schuster eds., 2014).
75 See Case C-147/08, Römer v. Freie & Hansestadt Hamburg, 2011 E.C.R. I03591, ¶ 38 (observing that “as is European Union law stands at present, legislation
on the marital status of persons falls within the competence of the Member States”);
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (states have “virtually
exclusive” control over marriage and domestic relations). Of course, the interaction
between family law and immigration law is not a one-way street. By determining
70
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states make different assumptions about “family” and, in the case of
Europe, those differences still have important implications on familybased immigration, particularly for same-sex couples and their children.
A. Family Diversity and Limitations in the E.U.
Modern U.S. immigration is governed by a centralized federal system,
whereas E.U. immigration is managed by a decentralized one — a hybrid
of twenty-eight separate member state immigration systems operating
within the constraints of the Union’s harmonizing requirements. The
major implication of this decentralized system is the wide variation of
approaches: some E.U. member states recognize “durable” same- and
different-sex couples regardless of marital or partnership registration status,76 while other member states do not even recognize married same-sex
couples for immigration purposes.77 Some member states authorize family reunification for grandparents or parents of legal residents while
others do not.78 This diverse treatment of family members is an important distinction between the E.U. and U.S. immigration systems.
Some of the differing approaches by E.U. member state immigration
regimes were intentional effects of the directives. At times, both directives defer to the member state governments and laws for determining
familial status. For instance, the Citizens Directive expressly provides
that registered partners must be allowed to enter and reside as “family
which family members can cohabitate, work or study in a given place, Union-wide
immigration law has profound implications on families and the laws regulating them
in member states. As scholars have begun to recognize, it is impossible to adequately
understand and deal with the many problems for immigrant and blended citizenimmigrant families without understanding both the family law and immigration law
components of fam-migration. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti,
Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 649 (2014) (identifying and
explaining distinctions between federal immigration law and state family law
definitions of parentage in the U.S.); Kari E. Hong, Famigration (Fam Imm): The
Next Frontier in Immigration Law, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 64 (2014) (noting the
need for scholarship examining immigration through a family law lens). This Article
is an attempt to connect the dots in some other areas of intersection between family
and immigration law. Additionally, the approaches of E.U. member states regarding
familial relations have been vastly different. See also Tryfonidou, supra note 74, at
140 (listing Bulgaria among E.U. member states providing no legal status to same-sex
couples); Elena Moore, Delaying Divorce: Pitfalls of Restrictive Divorce
Requirements, 1-29 J. FAM. ISSUES 1, 4, 7 (2015) (describing Ireland’s four-year
waiting period for divorce as one of the E.U.’s longest periods).
76 F.R.A. REPORT, supra note 1, at 85.
77 See supra Part I(C).
78 See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND LAWS, PART IV:
FOREIGN COUNTRY SURVEYS (2015), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/familyreunification/foreign.php#_ftn196 (describing provisions for needy or dependent
grandparents of legal residents to immigrate to Estonia and Luxembourg).
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members” only if the “host member state treats registered partnerships as
equivalent to marriage.”79 The Family Reunification Directive gives
member states discretion over the recognition of the second and third
categories of family members, including “partners,” as described above.80
Both directives permit, but do not require, full recognition of de facto
partners.81
But at other points, the directives provide clear E.U. rights to specified
“family members.” For instance, the Citizens Directive mandates specific
rights to E.U. citizens and their non-citizen spouses or qualifying registered partners, to reunite with minor or dependent “direct descendants”
and dependent “direct relatives in the ascending line.”82 Under this
broad and dynamic meaning of “family,” E.U. citizens can reunite with
their extended family, including parents-in-law, grandparents and
grandchildren, and, in some member states, with registered or de facto
partners.83
U.S. immigration law, on the other hand, has a narrower and less flexible definition of family. For most U.S. immigration purposes, family
means “immediate relatives,” namely spouses and minor children.84 A
U.S. citizen may petition for the entry and residence of his foreign
national parents,85 as well as for his siblings, adult children, or married
children; however, the waiting periods for these latter categories can
range from seven to well over twenty years.86 There are no categories for
grandchildren or grandparents, and unmarried partners are only recognized in very limited circumstances.87
79

Citizens Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(2)(b).
See supra Part I(A).
81 The Family Reunification Directive leaves the recognition of “unmarried
partner[s],” up to the member state with no real guidance. Family Reunification
Directive, supra note 3, art. 4(3). The Citizens Directive merely requires member
states to “facilitate entry and residence” of “the partner with whom the Union citizen
has a durable relationship, duly attested.” Citizens Directive, supra note 3, art. 3(2).
82 Citizens Directive, supra note 3, arts. 2(2)(c)-(d).
83 Id. The right to reunite with these extended and alternative family members is
mandatory under the Citizens Directive, but discretionary under the Family
Reunification Directive.
84 Titshaw, supra note 73, at 547-48.
85 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
86 See Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin, January 2015, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Dec. 9, 2014), http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/law-and-policy/
bulletin/2015/visa-bulletin-for-january-2015.html.
87 See 9 F.A.M. § 41.31 N14.4 (2013) (providing for B-2 classification of
cohabitating partners of nonimmigrant visa holders); 22 C.F.R. § 41.21 (2010)
(authorizing derivative status under some diplomatic visa categories for unmarried
partners “recognized as immediate family members . . . by the sending
[g]overnment”).
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The E.U.’s broader and more flexible definitions of family seem to
reflect the richly diverse cultural and familial norms in Europe, encompassing, for example, an extended family that includes grandparents and
unmarried partners.88 But despite its flexibility, the E.U. system and its
definitions of “family” have a number of shortcomings.
First, the E.U. system may be criticized as inconsistent and arbitrary.
Each host member state defines family as broadly or as narrowly as it
sees fit within the parameters of the directives — which may not align
with a particular family’s self-definition. For example, a legal resident of
Italy may not be allowed to migrate with his Canadian same-sex spouse
to Romania, as they would not be recognized as family members, but
they can move to Belgium.89 On the other hand, another legal resident of
Italy may be able to immigrate with her Canadian mother to Romania,
but not to Belgium.90 While the people in both hypotheticals may view
88 The U.S. system may be limited by the historical origins of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“I.N.A.”) in 1952. During a time when young couples with children
were beginning to leave behind extended families in cities and rural areas as they
moved to the suburbs, it may have seemed reasonable to limit “family” to the
“nuclear family” of different-sex married couples and their children. That grouping is
the only “immediate family” recognized without quota restrictions and the
accompanying lengthy wait in many areas of the I.N.A. This limited definition of
family has been criticized, but there is no current movement towards reforming these
restrictions. See Jessica Feinberg, The Plus One Policy: An Autonomous Model of
Family Reunification, 11 NEV. L.J. 629, 629-30 (2011).
89 Although not entirely clear, it appears that Romania may not recognize samesex spouses for immigration purposes. See COMM. OF MINISTERS, REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATION CM/REC(2010)5 OF THE COMMITTEE
OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON MEASURES TO COMBAT

DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION OR GENDER IDENTITY IN

ROMANIA, ILGA-Europe 2-3, 27, 50 (2012) (citing provisions of Romania’s amended
civil code that prohibit legal recognition of same-sex relationships including those
entered abroad, as well as statutory and constitutional provisions mandating
compliance with E.U. freedom of movement requirements and human rights treaties).
Belgium, which has recognized marriage equality for same-sex couples for over a
decade, allows migration by third-country national spouses and partners of its
permanent or temporary residents. Ad-hoc Query on Marriage – Rights to Entry and
Permanent Residence, EUROPEAN MIGRATION NETWORK 1 (May 3, 2011), http://
ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/
reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/family-reunification/274_emn_ad-hoc_query_marriage__entry_rights__residence_22nov2010_wider_dissemination_en.pdf.
90 See MIGRANT IMMIGRATION POLICY INDEX: 2015: ROMANIA 6 (2014), http://
www.mipex.eu/romania (stating “[n]on-EU sponsors can reunite with . . . adult
parents” in Romania); Ad-Hoc Query on extended family reunification, EUROPEAN
MIGRATION NETWORK 2 (Mar. 1, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/whatwe-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/familyreunification/276_emn_ad-hoc_query_extended_family_reunification_25nov
2010_wider_dissemination_en.pdf (stating that “in principle” parents and other
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themselves as family members, certain E.U. member states’ immigration
policies do not, and thus, their legal recognition is simply contingent upon
their host state’s laws.
Second, the “broader” sense of family under E.U. immigration law may
also be misleading. Though the categories seem extensive, they are subject to the specific procedures and detailed substantive requirements in
the directives, as well as to the discretion of member states for certain
matters.91 For instance, the directives permit member states to refuse
recognition of certain types of families, and the Family Reunification
Directive also allows for wait times and integration prerequisites prior to
entry, forestalling immigration for some recognized family members.92
Because the directives allow member states to exclude certain family
members and otherwise limit their rights, the E.U.’s definitions are likely
broader in theory than in fact.
Finally, the E.U. may be less attractive to families who view immigration as an initial step on a road to citizenship. Citizenship eligibility is
utterly unregulated by the E.U., and many European countries have
daunting requirements and long wait periods, even for children born in
their territories.93 These barriers may disincentivize prospective immigrants at the outset when they can foresee a long, unpredictable wait
before they qualify under the Citizens Directive to move freely around
Europe and to obtain preferential treatment for their families. Thus,
even to the extent that the flexible definitions of “family” under the E.U.
directives actually apply, families may be discouraged in practice by other
aspects of the system.
This comparison reveals that the E.U. experience may serve as both an
inspiration and a deterrent for U.S. policy proposals. Europe’s recogni“extended family members” of third-country national residents “cannot benefit” from
family reunification in Belgium).
91 See generally supra Parts I(A)-(C).
92 See discussion supra Part I(A) and notes 26-27.
93 See generally RAINER BAUBÖCK ET AL., ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP AND ITS
IMPACT ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION: EUROPEAN SUMMARY AND STANDARDS 3
(2013), http://eudo-citizenship.eu/images/acit/acit_report_eu%20level%20summary.
pdf. No country in Europe recognizes automatic citizenship to any child born within
its territory under the ius soli principle as do the United States and Canada. Id. at 8.
The average wait to become a naturalized citizen in the fifteen oldest E.U. member
states is around ten years, but it takes an average of fifteen to twenty years in some
countries. Id. at 9, 24. This is based on widely varying integration requirements,
including language and other tests, which may be liberalized for the close relatives of
a member state’s citizens, as well as the minimum durational residence requirements,
which generally range around five to ten years. Id. at 11. See also SARA WALLACE
GOODMAN, EUDO CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY: NATURALIZATION POLICIES IN
EUROPE: EXPLORING PATTERNS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 7, 13–19 (2010),
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/7-Naturalisation%20Policies%20in%20Europe.pdf.
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tion of extended and alternative family forms may provide valuable data
regarding the actual results of such recognition. However, the inequality
and lack of unity under the E.U.’s host-state-determined treatment of
unmarried partners and others may serve as a cautionary tale for Americans tempted to experiment with state-of-residence-based federal immigration rules regarding familial status.94
B. Federal Definitions and the Place-of-Celebration Rule in the U.S.
Since the E.U. has not yet determined the meaning of “spouse” under
the Family Migration Directives, an important question remains: how
should “spouse” be defined? Should the word “spouse” have an inclusive
or exclusive autonomous E.U. meaning? Or should its meaning be
treated as a choice-of-law issue to be determined under the law of the
place or member state of celebration, the member state of residence, or
the member state of nationality?
Here, the U.S. experience provides an important case for comparison.
Although the idea of member state “nationality” or “citizenship” has had
no U.S. equivalent since the United States achieved a borderless union
with its ratification of the post-Civil-War amendments and its adoption of
federal immigration laws in the nineteenth century,95 the concepts of
domicile and residence are important under state family law. Thus, the
U.S. has addressed the issue of defining “spouse” in a multi-tiered system, in two notable ways: a federal definition of “spouse” and a place-ofcelebration rule.
When it appeared that Hawaii might become the first U.S. state to
license same-sex marriages in 1996, the U.S. Congress and President Clinton established a federal definition of “spouse” by enacting the Defense
of Marriage Act (“D.O.M.A.”), which defined marriage as the union of
one man and one woman, for all federal purposes, including immigration.96 D.O.M.A. rendered a state’s same-sex marriage license meaning94

Although the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015), unifies most aspects of law for married same-sex couples among the
states, discrepancies continue regarding other issues such as consanguinity, marriage
alternatives, and parentage of children conceived through assisted reproductive
technology. See, e.g., Scott Titshaw, Sorry Ma’am Your Baby is an Alien: Outdated
Immigration Rules and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV.
47, 62-73 (2010).
95 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United
States and the state in which they reside[,]” clarifying that citizenship is a purely
federal matter, with no meaningful state role beyond establishment of its own
standards for recognizing state residence. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
96 See Scott Titshaw, A Modest Proposal to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens, &
etc.: Immigration Law, the Defense of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex
Couples, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 468-73 (2011) (describing the legislative history of
D.O.M.A.).
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less for immigration purposes, leaving thousands of U.S. citizens and
immigrants to choose between remaining alone in the U.S., apart from
their spouses, or moving abroad with their spouses.97 It also may have
disqualified the children of married same-sex couples under immigration
and nationality laws that hinged on their parents’ relationships, such as
“stepchildren” and children “born in wedlock.”98
The unjust treatment of these families prompted serious efforts to
reform immigration legislation.99 But before these efforts could succeed,
in 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down D.O.M.A.’s federal definition of “spouse,” in United States v. Windsor,100 as a violation of due process and equal protection. The Court reasoned that the federal definition
degraded and demeaned same-sex couples, their children, and the family
status bestowed on them under state law by differentiating them from
other state-recognized families and relegating them to “second-class” status for federal purposes.101 In the process, the Supreme Court also
expressed grave federalism concerns, since Congress had rejected “the
long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of
marriage are uniform for all married couples within each [s]tate, though
they may vary . . . from one state to the next.”102
Immediately after Windsor, the choice for defining “spouse” for federal purposes came down to two options:103 (1) the law of the state where
the marriage was celebrated or (2) the law of the state where the couple
would reside. This time, Congress did not act, and the Obama administration adopted a “place-of-celebration” rule that recognized same-sex
marriages for immigration purposes if the marriages were legally valid
where they were celebrated, whether in a U.S. state or a foreign coun97 See generally SCOTT LONG, JESSICA STERN & ADAM FRANCOEUR, FAMILIES,
UNVALUED: DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE FATE OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX
COUPLES UNDER U.S. LAW 152 (2006).
98 See Titshaw, supra note 96, at 411, 415-20 (describing and arguing against such a
reading of D.O.M.A.).
99 Ryan Lizza, What the DOMA Decision Means for Immigration Reform, THE
NEW YORKER (June 26, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/
2013/06/what-the-doma-decision-means-for-immigration-reform.html.
100 See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, §§ 1-3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(defining marriage for all federal purposes as the union of one man and one woman);
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675 (2013) (striking down that definition
as a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
101 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-96.
102 Id. at 2692.
103 One former U.S. Attorney General still supported a definition that excluded
same-sex couples, but the Supreme Court’s respect for same-sex couples and state
marriage law in Windsor clearly discouraged a renewed exclusionary federal
definition. See Alberto R. Gonzales & David N. Strange, What the Court Didn’t Say,
N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://nyti.ms/15NKz1A.
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try.104 Though some legislators attempted to mandate a state-of-residence rule,105 the place-of-celebration approach persisted. This rule was
consistent with most prior U.S. immigration precedents regarding marriages that were prohibited by the state — those involving anti-miscegenation, consanguinity, or a transgender or minor spouse.106 (In some
contexts, like consanguinity, these rules still remain relevant today.)
More importantly, the place-of-celebration rule was the only possible
approach that balanced respect for the traditional state role in licensing
marriages on the one hand, with the federal need for a fair and unified
immigration rule for all families on the other. Other options would forgo
one of these principles. A federal definition of marriage (even if inclusive
of same-sex couples) would ignore state family law entirely in favor of an
independent federal definition, which would be inappropriate without
clear legislative guidance or a clear constitutional rationale.107
Alternatively, a state-of-residence choice-of-law rule would have
destroyed the unity of federal family-based immigration law, creating different immigration rules with different requirements depending on the
couple’s state of residence.108 For instance, if a U.S. citizen married her
same-sex Spanish fiancé in New York and then moved to Iowa, under
Iowa state law, the U.S. citizen could have petitioned immediately for
lawful permanent residence on behalf of her Spanish wife and stepchildren. If the wife were in the U.S. illegally, her marriage might even provide a basis for relief from removal. If the couple moved to Texas,
however, the U.S. citizen would have no family-based route to permanent
residence for her spouse or stepchildren and would be ineligible to
request relief from removal if her wife faced deportation proceedings.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent recognition of a right to marriage
equality for same-sex couples in all states has now eliminated the interstate differences on which this hypothetical was based.109 Yet similar sce104 See Scott C. Titshaw, Revisiting the Meaning of Marriage: Immigration for
Same-Sex Spouses in a Post-Windsor World, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 167, 169
(2013) (describing how President Obama, the State Department, the Department of
Homeland Security and the Board of Immigration Appeals clarified this rule within
days of publication of the Supreme Court’s opinion).
105 See S. 435, 114th Cong. (2015). This bill actually focused mainly on state of
domicile rather than residence, presumably adding an implicit element of intent.
106 See Titshaw, supra note 73, at 564-79.
107 The U.S. Supreme Court found a constitutional right in Obergefell v. Hodges,
recognizing that the fundamental right to marriage applies to same- as well as
different-sex couples, resulting in recognition of marriage for same-sex couples in all
U.S. States. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015). The reasoning in Obergefell means the
federal government must also recognize the equality of same-sex spouses, eliminating
the option of any future Congress or President reverting to an anti-gay federal
marriage definition.
108 See infra Part IV(D)(2) for a fuller description of this argument.
109 See supra note 107.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\34-1\BIN102.txt

68

unknown

Seq: 24

17-MAY-16

BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

10:36

[Vol. 34:45

narios will occur in Europe if the E.C.J. adopts a state-of-residence (“host
state”) rule when it determines the meaning of “spouse” under the Family Migration Directives. The European Court would be better advised to
instead borrow the successful U.S. place-of-celebration rule to effectively
alleviate the current confusion regarding immigration policy.
III. METHODS

FOR

INTERPRETING E.U. DIRECTIVES

E.U. directives are authoritative instruments, with no exact equivalent
in other legal systems.110 They are typically used to harmonize member
states’ laws in a particular area, such as in family reunification.111 Unlike
E.U. regulations, directives typically require each member state to “transpose” them into domestic law112 — that is, member states are bound “to
the result to be achieved” in the directive but are left with “the choice of
form and methods.”113 Yet directives can prescribe the “result to be
achieved” in meticulous detail,114 often leaving member states with little
discretion regarding “form and methods.”115
Directives also serve as a source of rights and responsibilities for individuals in several different situations.116 Like other E.U. laws, they take
precedence over conflicting domestic law,117 and thus, member states’
courts must consider them, referring unclear issues under E.U. law to the
E.C.J.118
The methods of directive interpretation employed by the E.C.J. are
somewhat similar to those of statutory interpretation in the U.S. and
other countries.119 The E.C.J. has explained that it interprets E.U. law
“in accordance with generally accepted methods of interpretation, in particular by reference to the fundamental principles of the [E.U.] legal system and, where necessary, general principles common to the legal
systems of the Member States.”120
110

SACHA PRECHAL, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW 1 (2d ed. 2005).
Id. at 83-84.
112 Id. at 5-6, 15-16.
113 T.F.E.U., supra note 16, art. 288.
114 PRECHAL, supra note 110, at 14.
115 Id. at 14, 40, 73, 306.
116 Id. at 307.
117 Id. at 93-94.
118 Id. at 131-34, 180, 188 (describing duty of national courts to consider E.U. law);
Recommendations to National Courts and Tribunals in Relation to the Initiation of
Preliminary Ruling Proceedings, 2012 O.J. (C 338/1).
119 See LINDA JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 21-48 (2d ed.
2013) (describing American statutory interpretation based on theories largely
coinciding with these methods — textualist, intentionalist (historic) and purposivist —
while discussing contextual analysis as one of the tools used under each theory).
120 Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur S.A. v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland and The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp., ex parte: Factortame Ltd. &
Others, 1996 E.C.R. I-1029, ¶ 27.
111
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The “generally accepted methods” of the E.C.J. are the familiar textual, systematic, historical, and teleological analyses, systematized by
nineteenth century German legal scholar Carl Friedrich von Savigny.121
121 See Koen Lenaerts & José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, To Say What the Law of the EU
Is: Methods of Interpretation and the European Court of Justice, 20 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
3, 6, 16-17, 37 (2014) (discussing the “ ‘classical methods of interpretation’ – literal
interpretation, contextual interpretation [including both systematic and historical
intent] and teleological interpretation” and later focusing on comparative and
international methods of “consistent interpretation”); Opinion of the Advocate
General, Case C-399/11, Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, ¶ 39 (examining the “wording,
scheme and purpose,” including legislative intent, of a directive). See also Winfried
Brugger, Concretization of Law and Statutory Interpretation, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV.
L.F. 207, 232 (1996) (attributing the “classical cannon of interpretation”
encompassing “grammatical (also called textual, semantic), systematic (contextual,
structural), historical and teleological (purposive) interpretation” to Carl Friedrich
von Savigny); Hannes Rösler, Interpretation of EU Law, in 2 MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 979 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2012)
(classifying the E.C.J.’s methods of interpretation as “grammatical, systematic and
purposive” with rare use of von Savigny’s fourth method – historical analysis);
Bohumila Salachovà & Vı́tek Bohumil, Interpretation of European Law, Selected
Issues, in 61 ACTA UNIVERSITATIS AGRICULTURAE ET SILVICULTURAE
MENDELIANEAE BRUNENSIS 2717 (2013) (listing von Savigny’s classical methods as
“grammatical, logical, historical and systematical”); Eberhardt Grabitz & Meinhard
Hilf, DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION, Rn 32-33 (40th ed. 2009) (describing
the acknowledged German focus of legal interpretation as text, context, legislative
intent, and purpose).
Focusing on the international treaties that initially established the E.U. legal order,
one might look to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as the most direct
source of E.U. interpretive methods, and the E.C.J. has relied upon it in the context
of interpreting treaties entered between the E.U. and non-member states. SERGO
MANANASHVILI, MÖGLICHKEITEN UND GRENZEN ZUR VÖLKER- UND
EUROPARECTHLICHEN DURCHSETZUNG DER GENFER FLÜCHTLINGSKONVENTION 8788 (2009). The rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention were also strongly
influenced by von Savigny. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts.
31(1)-(3), May 23, 1969, 18232 U.N.T.S. 331 (listing ordinary textual meaning,
context, and object and purpose as the general rule for interpreting treaties, among
other Treaty-specific considerations such as subsequent practice). Like the E.C.J., the
Convention makes it clear that terms may have a “special meaning” in a legal
document. Id. art. 31(4). It allows for “supplementary means of interpretation” such
as examining preparatory works to understand original intent where textual meaning
is “ambiguous or obscure” or when the general rules of interpretation would lead to a
“result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” Id. art. 32.
The E.C.J. also relies on international treaties and customary international law as
sources in interpreting statutes in a way that U.S. courts do not. Like its member
states and many countries other than the U.S., E.U. law recognizes binding
international treaties as superior to ordinary legislative acts, although not to its
constitutional order. Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 40-41. Because
the most compelling international law related to the definition of “spouse” in the E.U.
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The “fundamental principles” of E.U. law are incorporated in the teleological method.122 The E.C.J. also employs a comparative method to
examine the “general principles common to the legal systems of the
Member States.”123
The E.C.J. has developed its own emphases and nuanced understandings of each method, based on the unique context and needs of the E.U.
legal system.124 The Court usually starts by examining the precise language and grammar of the text in question.125 It may then employ systematic, historical, teleological, or comparative methods to examine the
specific provision, in the context of the legislation or the larger E.U. system, as well as the purpose of such provision, legislation, or system.126
The E.C.J. may also investigate the historical intent of legislators or evaluate the comparative constitutional approaches of member states to the
same issues, if appropriate, within the E.U.’s autonomous legal order.127
Like U.S. courts, the E.C.J. does not follow the rules of interpretation
in a formalistic way.128 In any given case, the Court “is, in principle, free
to choose which of the methods of interpretation at its disposal best
serves the E.U. legal order.”129 For interpreting directives, “all the methods . . . operate in a mutually reinforcing manner.”130 In the process, the
E.C.J. also attempts to balance the natural tension between effective judicial support for treaty and legislative goals with respect for inter-institutional balance and “mutual and sincere cooperation” among the E.U.
member states — principles upon which the E.U. was founded.131 And as
Family Migration Directives is European human rights law, which is incorporated into
the E.U. constitutional order in a unique way, this Article will not delve into the way
that the E.C.J. might consider other treaties. For a good basic description of how the
E.C.J. will consider international law, see id. at 37-43.
122 See Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 44-51.
123 Id. The E.C.J. sometimes applies other methods as well, e.g., conformance with
international law, but those are beyond the scope of this Article. See id. at 37-43.
124 See id. at 44-51.
125 Id. at 13-14.
126 Id. at 59–61. Each of the methods described coincides with one or more
theories of interpretation. While these theoretical bases for interpretation color the
sources examined and other ways the methods are utilized, a discussion of the theory
is beyond the scope of this Article. For such a detailed discussion, see JELLUM, supra
note 119, at 21–48.
127 See Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 59-61.
128 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICABLE OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“The hard truth of the matter is that American courts
have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory
interpretation.”). See also JELLUM, supra note 119, at 25 (reaffirming the current
validity of this forty-year-old quote).
129 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 6.
130 Id. at 61.
131 Id. at 5-6.
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a relatively new judicial institution in a Union whose democratic legitimacy has been frequently criticized, the E.C.J. may react more quickly to
concerns of institutional legitimacy than more established national courts
would; this may cause the Court to hesitate before interpreting E.U. law
in ways that reach ahead of European public opinion and other institutions’ positions.132
While there is general agreement on the methods the E.C.J. uses to
interpret directives, there is some disagreement over their naming.133
This debate is easy to understand in light of the fact that E.U. law has
borrowed from both international treaty interpretation and the statutory
interpretation of civil and common law traditions.134
This Article adopts a modified version of methods identified in a recent
article on interpretation co-authored by E.C.J. Vice President Koen
Lenaerts and international scholar José A. Gutiérrez-Fons.135 The following subparts will introduce: (1) textual, (2) systematic, (3) historical,
(4) teleological and (5) comparative analyses. The E.U. treaties neither
list nor rank methods of legal interpretation,136 and I am not attempting
to prioritize them here. Rather, I move from the most specific to the least
specific of the source materials, anticipating the example analyzed in Part
IV.

132 See Robert Wintemute, In Extending Human Rights, Which European Court is
Substantively ‘Braver’ and Procedurally ‘Fitter’?, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE
EU: A MATTER FOR TWO COURTS 178, 180-91 (Sonia Morano-Foadi & Lucy Vickers
eds., 2015) (arguing that the E.C.J. has been too cautious in cases involving sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination, waiting for the European Court of
Human Rights to lead the way in recognizing rights).
133 Compare Rösler, supra note 121, at 979 (classifying the E.C.J.’s methods of
interpretation as “grammatical, systematic and purposive”) with Lenaerts &
Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, passim (classifying the others as textualism,
contextualism (both “systematic” and based on “travaux préparatoires), and
teleological). See also Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I621, ¶ 47 (explaining that, as of 1998, “the scope . . . of [European] Community law, is
to be determined only by having regard to its wording and purpose, its place in the
scheme of the [EC Treaty] and its legal context”).
134 See Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 6.
135 Id. Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons provide an excellent starting point for
understanding the methods of interpretation utilized by the [E.C.J.] with regard to
both secondary law like directives and the treaties comprising primary E.U. law. See
id. at 5-6. The current work could be read in conjunction with that article in order to
illustrate one detailed example of interpretation of a disputed term in E.U. directives.
136 Id. at 6.
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A. Textual Analysis
The E.C.J. will generally start with a textual analysis, looking for an
unambiguous meaning of the text.137 This plain meaning approach promotes the interests of predictability, transparency, institutional balance,
and legal legitimacy.138 Yet textual analysis is rarely sufficient; plain
meaning seldom ends the E.C.J.’s interpretation of E.U. treaties or secondary E.U. law, including directives.139 Primarily focusing on textual analysis is subject to criticism even in the context of U.S. federal statutes,
since the “plain meaning” may be different or ambiguous for different
people,140 a problem that is complicated exponentially in the multi-lingual, multi-jurisdictional context of the E.U.141
As it applies here to “spouse[s],” both proponents and opponents of
recognizing married same-sex couples as “spouse[s]” under the Family
Migration Directives could reasonably argue for opposite but “unambiguous meanings” of the word “spouse.” This is not unusual. Thus, for the
E.C.J., the plain meaning of the words and grammar in a text rarely ends
an inquiry into E.U. legislation, particularly in light of two interconnected
factors: (1) the need for Union-wide legal uniformity and equality and (2)
the principle of linguistic equality in a multilingual order.
1. Uniformity and Autonomy
The principle of uniformity is common in two-tiered systems: federal
judicial systems usually rely on a higher-level supreme court for the final
interpretation of federal laws.142 In the E.U., the E.C.J. “was established
137 See, e.g., Case C-48/07, Belgium v. Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves, 2008 E.C.R. I10627, ¶ 44; Case C-263/06, Carboni v. Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze &
Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà SpA, 2008 E.C.R. I-1077, ¶ 48; Case C-220/03,
European Cent. Bank v. Germany, 2005 E.C.R. I-10595, ¶ 31.
138 See Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 9 (crediting the benefits of
“literal” textualism to legal certainty and the institutional balance of powers
enshrined in Article 13(2) of the Treaty on European Union); JELLUM, supra note
119, at 31 (describing benefits of textualism for “increasing predictability and
efficiency, encouraging more careful legislative drafting, and limiting inappropriate
use of legislative history”).
139 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 6-7, 9, in addition to the
multilingual issues discussed below with regard to directives, the E.U. treaties were
generally drafted in very broad terms, adding another reason to go beyond the text in
interpreting them.
140 JELLUM, supra note 119, at 29.
141 See, e.g., Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-582/08, Comm’n v. United
Kingdom, 2010 E.C.R. I-7195, ¶ 27 (reasoning that “the literal interpretation and the
clear meaning may not be synonymous as the literal meaning of a provision may be
ambiguous”).
142 This commonality can be implemented through different models. For instance,
the U.S. employs a single Supreme Court as the court of last resort for legal issues
triggering federal jurisdiction. Germany, on the other hand, features different
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with a view to ensuring the proper application and uniform interpretation” of E.U. law “in all the Member States . . . prevent[ing] . . . divergences in judicial decisions on questions” of E.U. law.143 As such, the
E.C.J. acknowledges that uniform application of E.U. law is fundamental
to the European legal order, even in the context of directives.144
In order to ensure E.U. law has a uniform and consistent meaning
throughout the Union, the E.C.J. has long recognized the “autonomy
principle,” whereby E.U. terms generally have a single definition — independent of any national understanding of the same term.145 With the
exception of E.U. legislation that expressly defers to the member states,
such as the Citizens Directive that relies on member state treatment of
“registered partners,”146 the terms of E.U. provisions “must normally be
given an autonomous and uniform interpretation” throughout the
Union.147 Because of differences in general and legal cultures, such
Union-wide definitions are not likely to correspond with an ordinary
reading of the text in some member states.
The autonomy principle is crucial for the uniform interpretation of
E.U. legislation, particularly in light of the principle of linguistic equality
supreme courts for different subject matter areas, such as the Federal Constitutional
Court, the Federal Court of Justice for Civil and Criminal Matters, and other federal
courts of last resort for Labor Law, Financial Law, and Social Law. See Court System
in Germany, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/
profiles/CourtSystemGermany.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
143 Case C-283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, ¶ 7.
144 See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur S.A. v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp., ex parte:
Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-1029, ¶¶ 33, 46 (calling uniform application of the law
a “fundamental requirement of the [Union’s] legal order”); SACHA PRECHAL,
DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW 259 (2d ed. 2005) (describing concern with uniform
application of E.U. law as a primary concern of the E.C.J.).
145 Joined Cases C424/10 & C-425/10, Ziolkowski v. Land Berlin, intervening
parties: Vertreter des Bundesinteresses beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 2011 E.C.R.
I-14051, ¶ 32 (“according to settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of
European Union law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a
provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the
Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally
be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European
Union”); Case C-283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, ¶ 19
(noting that “even where the different language versions are entirely in accord with
one another” E.U. law “uses terminology which is peculiar to it” and concepts with a
different meaning than they have under the law of the various member states). See
also Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 7.
146 See supra Part I(B).
147 Case C-174/08, NCC Construction Danmark A/S v. Skatteministeriet, 2009
E.C.R. I-10567, ¶ 24, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=c-174/08
(last visited Sept.18, 2015).
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described below.148 Without a controlling, autonomous E.U. definition,
many terms of a directive could have different meanings when transposed
into the ordinary language or domestic legal terminology of the twentyeight different E.U. countries.149
2. Multilingualism and Linguistic Equality
The European Union has twenty-four official and working languages.150 E.U. treaties, legislation and other official documents are provided in all of the languages,151 and all E.U. citizens have the right to
access these documents and communicate with Union officials in any of
these languages.152 Under the principle of linguistic equality, there is no
one official version of an E.U. document.153 This means that a purely
textualist approach must focus on many different versions of the text and
ensure that the “plain meaning” is plain in all twenty-four languages.154
Of course, this is highly unlikely.155
Since the textual approach is the starting point of directive interpretation, a close reading of the various versions of a directive may nevertheless help determine the purpose or the overarching scheme of the
directive, and it may guide the subsequent systematic, historical, or teleo148

See infra Part III(A)(2). See also Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at

R

See generally Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 6-7.
This is unique. See Theodor Schilling, Language Rights in the European Union,
9 GERMAN L.J. 1219, 1222-25 (2008) (describing the E.U. as exceptional in
comparison to bilingual Canada, trilingual Belgium, quadrilingual Switzerland, South
Africa (with eleven official languages, but only two government languages), and
various international organizations, which each employ only a few official languages).
151 Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Republic of Croatia and the
Adjustments to the Treaty on European Union, et al., 55 O.J. (L 112/21) 21, 25
(adding Croatian to the twenty-three languages previously listed in the Treaty on
European Union). This often results in E.U. terminology which is peculiar to it, and
divergent from the ordinary legal meaning of the same terms in the native country for
a given linguistic version of E.U. texts. Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at
7.
152 T.F.E.U., supra note 16, art. 20(2)(d).
153 Council Regulation 1/58/EC on Determining the Languages to be Used by the
European Economic Community, 1958 O.J. (L 385/58) 58. (last modified by Council
Regulation 517/2013, Adapting Certain Regulations and Decisions by Reason of the
Accession of the Republic of Croatia, 201 O.J. (L 158) 1, 71 (EU)). See also Case C283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, ¶ 18 (“the different
language versions are all equally authentic”).
154 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 13, 35 (explaining that
“textualism, as a method of interpretation does not suffice where linguistic
divergences exist”); Case C-29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt (Social Welfare
Office), 1969 E.C.R. 419, ¶ 3.
155 In light of the problems pointed out above, resort to external sources of plain
meaning, namely dictionaries, are not common in the E.U. system.
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logical analyses.156 Moreover, the dual principles of Union-wide uniformity and multilingual equality magnify the universal legal tendency to
shift away from ordinary, plain meanings towards new, technical legal terminology,157 a corollary of the autonomy principle described above.158
B. Systematic Analysis
Under a systematic approach, the E.C.J. examines the functional context of a provision or term, within the legislation at issue or within the
broader legal system to which it belongs, to find a meaning in harmony
with the context.159 Unlike the historical analysis approach below, the
relevant context is not the meaning of the words on the date of enactment, but their “state of evolution at the date on which the provision in
question is to be applied.”160 This method assumes that legislators are
rational actors who work to establish an internally consistent and complete legal order.161
Similar to U.S. rules of statutory interpretation, the E.C.J. follows the
principle of effet utile; it reads each provision of a law to have its own
specific and exclusive meaning so that no provision is redundant.162 The
Court also observes the principle that ambiguous provisions should be
read to be consistent with the general scheme of the law of which they are
a part.163 And akin to the U.S.’s “constitutional avoidance” doctrine, the
E.C.J. observes the principle of “harmonious interpretation,” in which
secondary E.U. legislation must be “interpreted, as far as possible, in such
156

Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 13-14 (describing how textual
analyses of certain language versions of E.U. texts “operate as an ancillary,
corroborative argument”).
157 See Case C-283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, ¶ 19
(“[E]ven where different language versions are entirely in accord with one another . . .
[E.U.] law uses terminology which is peculiar to it.”).
158 See supra Part III(A)(1).
159 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 20. Americans tend to reference
the former as statutory context and the latter as in pari marteria (regarding other
statutes “on the same subject matter”). See JELLUM, supra note 119, at 127-30.
160 Case C-283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, ¶ 20
(emphasis added).
161 Id. at 17. See also T.F.E.U. supra note 16, art. 7 (requiring “consistency
between” E.U. policies and activities); Koen Lenaerts, The Rule of Law and the
Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1625, 1625-26, 1643-44, 1659 (2007).
162 PRECHAL, supra note 144, at 259 (classifying effet utile as a primary tool of the
E.C.J.); Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 17, 20. See also LINDA D.
JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 132 (2d ed. 2013) (Americans
would call this a “rule against surplusage” or redundancy).
163 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 17. (this rule is sometimes called
in pari materia). See JELLUM, supra note 162, at 127-30.
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a way as not to detract from its validity.”164 As such, this principle discourages interpretations that conflict with superior E.U. law, such as the
fundamental rights to equal treatment and freedom of movement, as well
as other primary goals of European integration.165
Under a systematic approach, the E.C.J. looks beyond the directive in
question, to its functional relationship with related directives and the
larger normative system to which they belong, “[j]ust as the different
parts of an engine must work together to keep it running.”166 Here, in
the context of family-based migration, the Family Migration Directives
work together just as the various legislation they replaced had functioned
before. Thus, it makes sense to interpret terminology consistently if it is
repeated in similar contexts in both directives.167
The focus of the systematic approach on internal consistency in and
among the texts is similar to the textual approach, but also in the broad
sense, it shares elements of the teleological approach, which will be discussed further below.
C. Historical Analysis
A historical analysis relies on the directive’s legislative history — its
travaux préparatoires — as a primary tool for understanding the text.168
Like American “intentionalists,” European jurists focusing on legislative
history seek to reveal and implement the specific intent of the legislators
who enacted a directive at the time of enactment.169 Their primary tools
are the written records of the legislative process, the failure or success of
proposed textual amendments during that process, and the legislative
acquiescence to existing statutory interpretation based on a subsequent
failure to amend.170
The historical approach, like intentionalism, has a number of shortcomings, however. First, it can have an ossifying effect because the historical
legislative intent remains fixed and unable to adapt to unforeseen technological and societal developments.171 Because E.U. legislation often
164

Case C-403/99, Italy v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. I-6897, ¶ 37.
Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 20, 21; PRECHAL, supra note 144,
at 180-81. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402/07 & C-432/07, Sturgeon v. Condor Flugdienst
GmbH and Böck v. Air France, 2009 E.C.R. I-10923, ¶¶ 46-48 (interpreting a
regulation on airline passenger compensation to avoid conflict with the right to equal
treatment).
166 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 16.
167 Americans would call this the cannon of consistent usage. See JELLUM, supra
note 162, at 127 (“identical words should have identical meanings”).
168 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 23-31.
169 See id. at 24 (noting increased European focus on travaux préparatoires to
determine legal aims); JELLUM, supra note 162, at 36 (describing the method and
goals of American intentionalists).
170 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 30-31.
171 See id. at 28; JELLUM, supra note 162, at 41.
165
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requires supermajorities or unanimous agreement to enact, the
probability of ossification may be even greater, and corrective amendments even less likely to occur, in the E.U. context.172
Second, ascertaining specific legislative intent may be a futile exercise.
As one American scholar put it:
[T]he idea that there is one unified “meeting of the minds” [among
enacting legislators] is nonsense. While members of the legislature
may share the goal of passing a bill to address a particular problem,
rarely will all members have the same reason for passage or even the
same expectations regarding the bill’s effects.173
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has been particularly critical in his assessment of the historical method, maintaining that, “[i]f one
were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, was more
likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising
candidate than legislative history.”174 Not only is it impossible to determine specific intent in many contexts, but extensive legislative source
material renders historical analysis ripe for manipulation by activist
judges.175 Justice Scalia suspects that manipulative judges understand
that “the trick is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out your
friends.”176
Just as American legislation is often the result of compromises within
and between the House of Representatives, the Senate and the President,
European directives are cobbled together through a complex drafting,
consulting, amending, and voting process involving the Commission, the
Council of the European Union (“Council”) and the European Parliament (“Parliament”), as well as various committees and advisory bodies
within and beyond those three institutions. Determining legislators’ common intent proves difficult, if it exists at all.177 The members of various
E.U. institutions do not necessarily have the same understanding of a particular provision of Union law.178

172

R

173

R

T.F.E.U., supra note 16, art. 20(2)(d).
See JELLUM, supra note 162, at 22.
174 Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis
in original).
175 JELLUM, supra note 162, at 36.
176 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 36 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997) (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal).
177 JELLUM, supra note 162, at 35-36.
178 See Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-28/76, Milac v. Hauptzollamt
Freiburg, 1976 E.C.R. 1664; Guido Itzcovich, The Interpretation of Community Law
by the European Court of Justice, 10 GERMAN L.J. 537, 554-55 (2009). Part IV(B)(4)
below provides an excellent illustration of this point.
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While U.S. jurists have tended to move away from legislative history as
a primary interpretative tool in favor of the primacy of the text,179 the
E.C.J. seems to be moving in the opposite direction, as travaux
préparatoires have become increasingly detailed and available.180 At the
outset, however, the E.C.J. hardly used legislative history and repeatedly
refused to interpret the provisions of the 1957 Treaty of Rome (establishing the European Economic Community) under this historical
approach.181 This reluctance was understandable since there were no
readily available negotiation records at the time regarding the founding
treaty of what would later become the European Union.182
With greater maintenance of and public access to recent travaux
préparatoires, however, the E.C.J. appears to be more willing to engage in
historical analysis.183 Historical analysis may be even more influential in
the context of directives and regulations, since they are likely to be
detailed and technical in nature, and are often accompanied by legislative
records that are publicly available and free to anyone with an Internet
connection.184
Nevertheless, it is still too early to tell just how important legislative
history will become to the E.C.J.’s analysis.185 The concerns about the
ossifying effect, futility, and manipulability of legislative history still persist. Therefore, scholars tend to agree that legislative history should generally play a secondary role, if any, in the interpretation of E.U.
directives.186

179

WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 770-71 (3d ed. 2001).
180 See Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 24, 26.
181 Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-2/74, Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974
E.C.R. 657, 665-66. The European Economic Community (“E.E.C.”) was the early
predecessor of the E.U.
182 Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-583/11 Kanatami v. Parliament &
Council, 2013 E.C.L.I. 21, ¶ 32 (attributing the E.C.J.’s refusal to focus on drafting
history in earlier eras to the unavailability of travaux préparatoires for the founding
documents).
183 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 24, 26-27, 31 (for instance, the
negotiation histories for later treaties, such as the Treaty of Lisbon, have been better
maintained).
184 Itzcovich, supra note 178, at 554. For publicly available E.U. legislative
records, see generally EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/.
185 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 59-60 (recognizing the legitimacy
of considering travaux préparatoires while stating that the role they will tend to play
for the E.C.J. “remains an open question”).
186 Id. at 22, 26, 28-29.
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D. Teleological Analysis
The most prominent E.C.J. method of interpretation is teleological
analysis.187 Under this method, which is similar to purposivism, the
Court determines the objectives of a particular law or, in some cases, of
the E.U. system as a whole, and then interprets the provision in question
in a way that best accomplishes those objectives.188 This approach is
often combined with the systematic approach because a systematic understanding of the law and its normative system helps uncover the relevant
objectives and vice versa.189
In the specific context of directives, European judges primarily use the
teleological approach, given the goal-oriented nature of this form of legislation. As discussed above, while directives allow member states some
discretion in the “form and methods” for achieving a result or purpose,
that margin of discretion is sometimes reduced “to a considerable
degree” because member states are “under an obligation to take, within a
given period, all the measures needed in order to achieve the result
required by a directive.”190 Thus, the purpose of the directive evidently
has a controlling effect, and the teleological approach looks to uncover
and implement this purpose.
While the details of this analysis are largely unclear, some guidelines on
the teleological approach are apparent. A broad interpretation of the
text is warranted if it is the only way to achieve the objectives of the law,
or if the provision in question “give[s] expression to a principle of constitutional importance for the objectives set out in the Treaties.”191 For
example, the E.C.J. has specifically held that the provisions of the Citizens Directive and others governing the right to move and reside freely
within the Union, “cannot be interpreted restrictively.”192 Exceptions, on
187

Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 656, 664 (1996) (former Advocate General Fennelly calls the
teleological approach the “characteristic element in the [E.C.J.]’s interpretive
method”). This approach was dominant during the developing stages of many
familiar statutory regimes, including those of medieval England and the early U.S. as
well as the E.U. JELLUM, supra note 162, at 39. These early lawmakers tended to
draft laws broadly, “imbued with a purpose driven functionalism.” Lenaerts &
Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 31.
188 Fennelly, supra note 187, at 666.
189 Id. at 664.
190 Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur S.A. v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland and The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp., ex parte: Factortame Ltd.,
1996 E.C.R. I-1029, ¶ 46 (emphasis added). See also T.F.E.U., supra note 16, art. 288.
191 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 33.
192 Case C-267/83, Diatta v. Berlin, 1985 E.C.R. 567, ¶¶ 16-17; Case C-413/99,
Bombast v. Sec’y State for Home Dep’t, 2002 E.C.R. I-7091, 158, ¶ 74; Case C-291/05,
Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. Eind, 2007 E.C.R. I-10719, ¶43;
Case C-127/08, Metock v. Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform, 2008 E.C.R.
I-6241, ¶ 84; Case C-162/09, Sec’y for Work v. Lassal, 2010 E.C.R. I-9217, ¶ 31.
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the other hand, “are to be interpreted strictly so that general rules are not
negated.”193
In the context of “constructive ambiguity,” where legislators have
“agreed to disagree,” several scholars have observed that the E.C.J. follows a “meta-teleological approach” — particularly when the E.U. is
required to cope with changing times.194 This highly flexible method of
interpretation has been described as a “function of the dynamic character
of the process of integration recognized in the [t]reaty,” supporting the
overarching “objective of creating ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’”195
E. Comparative Analysis
In addition to the classic methods discussed above, the E.C.J. also uses
a comparative approach, considering “where necessary, general principles
common to the legal systems of the Member States.”196 U.S. federal
courts have occasionally looked to the constitutional orders of U.S. states
to determine whether a right is fundamental.197 The E.C.J. however does
so much more frequently as the Court is constitutionally required to
respect member state national identities and “value diversity.”198
Under this method, there can be “a strong correlation between the
degree of convergence among the national legal systems and the deference shown to national law by the E.C.J.”199 In examining member
193 Case C-346/08, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2010 E.C.R. I-03491, ¶ 39; Case
C-476/01, Kapper, 2004 E.C.R. I-5205, ¶ 72.
194 Miguel Poiares Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in
the Context of Constitutional Pluralism, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2007); MITCHEL
LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 359 (2004).
195 Maduro, supra note 194, at 11. Here, American students of statutory
interpretation might recognize echoes of Professor Bill Eskridge’s description of
dynamic statutory interpretation. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, 9-10 (1994).
196 Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur S.A. v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland and The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp., ex parte: Factortame Ltd.,
1996 E.C.R. I-1029, ¶ 27.
197 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (looking to state movement in
eliminating anti-miscegenation laws in recognizing related federal rights); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986) (referencing continued state anti-sodomy laws
in refusing to strike down Georgia’s law); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003)
(looking to state movement in eliminating sodomy laws in holding such laws violate
due process rights under federal constitution).
198 See Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 47-48.
199 Id. at 49. See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts & José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Constitutional
Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1629, 1633 (2010).
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states’ legal systems, the E.C.J. uses an “evaluative approach,”200 which
involves identifying any trends among member states or seeking out solutions that reflect the mission of the Union.201 The E.C.J. then chooses
solutions “which, having regard to the objects of the [t]reaty, appear to
[the Court] to be the best or . . . the most progressive.”202 Through this
analysis, the E.C.J. has derived and recognized fundamental rights from
the guarantees of the European Convention on Human Rights and from
the constitutional traditions common to the member states.203 The comparative method is particularly useful when the E.C.J. is developing general principles of E.U. “federal common law,” filling in the gaps, whether
or not they were intentional, when no E.U. treaty or legislation is on
point.204
This practice is of strategic institutional importance, particularly for the
E.U. whose legitimacy has been criticized at times.205 As some scholars
noted, “[w]hen it comes to discovery and development of general principles of E.U. law, the E.C.J. can reinforce its legitimacy by adopting a
comparative law methodology, taking account of Member States’ [established and democratically legitimated] legal systems.”206 As such, the
E.C.J. may sometimes compare member state laws in order to uncover
general interests that might outweigh central Union objectives, in light of
200

See Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 49-51. The E.C.J. does not
find a “lowest common denominator” or merely apply the majority approach. Id. at
50. Regarding the former, such a calculus would be difficult in any case since the
populations of the member states vary so dramatically from less than 500,000 in Malta
to over 81,000,000 in Germany. COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FACT SHEET,
NEW METHOD OF CALCULATING A QUALIFIED MAJORITY IN THE COUNCIL (Sept. 29,
2014), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/
144960.pdf. This is the reason for the qualified majority voting system in the Council,
requiring votes of fifty-five percent of member states, representing sixty-five percent
of E.U. population. Id.
201 Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-550/07, Akzo Nobel Chem. v.
European Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-8360, ¶ 96. See also Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons,
supra note 121, at 51.
202 Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-14/61, (Jan. 24, 2012) Hoogovens v.
High Authority, 1962 E.C.R. 253, 283-84; Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C282/10, Dominguez v. Centre Informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique, 2012 E.C.J.
EUR-Lex 62010CJ0282. See also Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 50.
203 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union. art. 6(3), 2012
O.J. (C 326/01) 13 (requiring respect for “[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by the
[E.C.H.R.] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, [which] shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law”)
[hereinafter T.E.U.].
204 See Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 48 (describing the
comparative law method as providing “a good framework for the E.C.J. to undertake
‘federal common law-making’ ”).
205 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
206 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 46-47.
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the promise of the primary E.U. treaties to “respect [member states’] rich
cultural and linguistic diversity.”207
In effect, the comparative analysis can also overlap with the teleological approach above, in terms of its consideration of the goal of interstate
diversity (what Americans would classify as “federalism”). In addition to
broad fundamental human rights, the comparative approach has also
been used to determine the meaning of specific terms in E.U. documents
in certain civil cases, including one concerning the clarifications of
“spouse” and “marriage” to not include unmarried partners and partnerships,208 which will be discussed further below.
IV. INTERPRETING

THE

FAMILY MIGRATION DIRECTIVES

The meaning of the word “spouse” in the Family Migration Directives
remains open to question, and scholars have offered widely different
views.209 Below, I examine this question in great detail without any pretense that the E.C.J. or the Advocate General would examine the issue so
comprehensively under all of the interpretive methods. Courts on both
sides of the Atlantic generally do not employ all of the aforementioned
rules of statutory or directive interpretation; they pick and choose their
methods depending on the case. However, this rigorous academic exercise may provide insight for the E.C.J. and scholars in Europe on the
paths of interpretation the court can or may take.
The organization of the following analysis is somewhat artificial
because the scope of each method is not entirely clear. For example, the
early legal recognition of same-sex marriage in the Netherlands and
207 T.E.U., supra note 203, art. 3(3). See also T.F.E.U., supra note 16, art. 167(4)
(“The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other
provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the
diversity of its cultures.”). Those same documents also provide for freedom of
movement in a borderless area and to “combat discrimination based on sex . . . or
sexual orientation” in “defining and implementing its policies and activities.” Id. art.
10.
208 See, e.g., Case C-59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. I-01283, ¶ 10
(pointing out that social developments in the Union as a whole would be necessary to
justify expansion of the term “spouse” in a regulation to include unmarried partners
in a stable relationship); Joined Cases C-122/99 P & C-125/99 P. D. & Sweden v.
Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-4319, ¶ 34 (stating in dicta in case refusing to recognize a
same-sex partnership as a “marriage” under the E.U.’s Staff Regulations that
“according to the definition generally accepted by the Member States, the term
‘marriage’ means a union between two persons of the opposite sex”). See also infra
Part IV(B)(1).
209 See, e.g., Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 49 (citing recent
developments at various levels of European law and noting that “it will be interesting
to see how the [E.C.J.] will interpret the concept of ‘spouse’ for the purposes of
relevant secondary [E.U.] law, notably” the Citizens Directive). See also supra notes
9-11.
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Belgium can fit under a historical analysis, because this history helps
reveal the possible intent of legislators when they referenced “spouse[s]”
in the directives;210 or under a textual analysis, with its ordinary meaning
of the word “spouse;” or under a comparative analysis, focusing on the
developing legal orders of E.U. member states. Yet regardless of the theoretical organization in instances of overlap, the resulting analysis is
largely similar.
A. Textual and Systematic Analyses: Defining “Spouse” Broadly and
Consistently
Combining textual and systematic approaches here is sensible because
both methods rely on the text of the two E.U. directives — the first in
isolation and the second together. The text of the directives generally
supports a broadly inclusive interpretation of “spouse,” to include married same-sex couples,211 and the systematic comparison of the texts supports a common, consistent treatment of “spouse[s]” in both directives.
1. The Text of the Family Reunification Directive
The Family Reunification Directive provides three lists of family members, whom member states (1) shall, (2) may, or (3) shall not provide
entry and residence.212 Under the first category, the directive emphasizes
that “[f]amily reunification should apply in any case to the members of
the nuclear family.”213 After defining “sponsor” to be a “third-country
national residing lawfully in a Member State,” the directive provides that
member states “shall authorise the entry and residence . . . of the . . .
sponsor’s spouse” and “the minor children of the sponsor and his/her
spouse” if they meet certain required conditions.214
Under the second category, the directive provides that “the Member
States may authorise the entry and residence” of “first-degree [depen210

See Kees Waaldijk, Great Diversity and Some Equality: Non-Marital Legal
Family Formats for Same-Sex Couples in Europe, 1 GENUIS 42, 44 (2014)
(chronology of legal recognition of civil marriage in Europe).
211 Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, recitals 5, 9.
212 Id. art. 4.
213 Id. recital 9. German: “Die Familienzusammenführung sollte auf jeden Fall für
die Mitglieder der Kernfamilie, d.h. den Ehegatten und die minderjährigen Kinder
gelten.” Spanish: “La reagrupación familiar debe aplicarse en todo caso a los
miembros de la familia nuclear, es decir, al cónyuge y a los hijos menores de edad.”
French: “Le regroupement familial devrait viser, en tout état de cause, les membres
de la famille nucléaire, c’est-à-dire le conjoint et les enfants mineurs.” Italian: “Il
ricongiungimento familiare dovrebbe riguardare in ogni caso i membri della famiglia
nucleare, cioè il coniuge e i figli minorenni.” Dutch: “De leden van het kerngezin, dat
wil zeggen de echtgenoot en de minderjarige kinderen, hebben steeds recht op
gezinshereniging.”
214 Id. art. 4(1) (emphasis added).
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dent] relatives in the ascending line” and certain dependent adult children of the sponsor or spouse, as well as:
the unmarried partner, being a third-country national, with whom the
sponsor is in a duly attested stable long-term relationship, or of a third
country national who is bound to the sponsor by a registered partnership . . . and of the unmarried minor children, including adopted children, as well as the adult unmarried children who are objectively
unable to provide for their own needs on account of the state of
health, of such persons.215
The directive also provides that member states “may” set a minimum
age up to twenty-one for immigrating sponsors and their “spouse[s]” in
order “to ensure better integration and to prevent forced marriages.”216
Under the third category, the directive generally disapproves of polygamous marriages.217 In order to “respect the rights of women and of children,”218 it provides that member states “shall not authorise the family
reunification of a further spouse” for a polygamous sponsor who “already
has a spouse living with him in the territory of a Member State.”219 Yet
member states may choose whether to provide immigration benefits to
the sponsor’s children with that “further spouse.”220
To begin the textual analysis of the word “spouse,” it seems worthwhile
to examine the ordinary meaning of “spouse.” Yet depending on the perspective, there are two ordinary, but opposite, meanings. And those
meanings have been changing rapidly. By the time the Family Reunification Directive was enacted in 2003, the Netherlands, Belgium and Ontario (Canada) already authorized marriage for same-sex couples.221 Thus,
the term “spouse,” as understood by laypersons and lawyers in 2003,
arguably included married same-sex couples. Nevertheless, many European jurisdictions have either adopted or expressly rejected same-sex
marriage since 2003, and legally defined “spouse” one way or the other.
In each case, the people of these states have clearly contemplated the
215

Id. arts. 4(2)-4(3) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 4(5). For the purposes of dependents of refugees, it is completely
comprehensive, creating a catch-all category of “other family members not referred to
in Article 4” and clarifies that member states “may authorize family reunification” for
them as well. Id. art. 10(2).
217 Id. art. 4(4).
218 Id. recital 11.
219 Id. art. 4(4).
220 Id.
221 Waaldijk, supra note 210, at 45. Today, ten member states have decided to
legally authorize same-sex marriages, and two others are seriously considering such a
change. See infra notes 335-36 and accompanying text. The Canadian province of
Ontario began authorizing same-sex marriages in June 2003. Halpern v. Toronto
(City), 172 O.R. 3d. 162, 201 (2003).
216
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possibility of same-sex marriage and thereby expanded the ordinary
meaning of the words “marriage” and “spouse.”222
Neither the E.C.J. nor the Advocate General normally resort to dictionary citations, as American judges sometimes do, to find the plain
meaning of a term.223 In the E.U. context, the use of dictionaries is especially futile, considering that the E.U. has twenty-four official languages,
using different words for the rapidly evolving term “spouse” in their
respective directives.224
The terms for “spouse” in different language versions of the Family
Reunification Directive include: “le conjoint” in French, “el cónyuge” in
Spanish, “il coniuge” in Italian, “dem Ehegatten” in German, and “de
echtgenoot” in Dutch. Depending on the dictionary, the popular meaning of these terms is either heteronormative or gender neutral. Generally, the brief definitions in standard online editions of respected
dictionaries present a gender-neutral meaning that could include samesex spouses, even in the languages of countries that do not legally recognize same-sex marriage.225 Older dictionaries usually include gendered

222

See infra Part IV(D)(1).
See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Webster’s Third International Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary to indicate that
“[t]he term ‘marriage’ ordinarily contemplates a relationship between a man and a
woman”).
224 There are now twenty-four official E.U. languages, see supra note 150, and in
2003 there were already twelve languages, including the examples employed below.
Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 13, 2001 O.J.
(C 80/1) 55.
225 See, e.g., Spouse, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/spouse (last visited Sept. 14, 2015) (defining “spouse” in gendered, but not
necessarily heterosexual terms as “someone who is married: a husband or wife”);
Conjoint,
LAROUSSE, http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/
conjoint_conjointe/18238 (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (defining the French “conjoint”
in gender neutral terms as “chacun des époux,” meaning “Personne unie à une autre
par le marriage”); Epoux, LAROUSSE, http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/
époux/30602?q=epoux#30516 (last visited Sept. 18, 2015); Ehegatte, DUDEN, http://
www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Ehegatte (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (defining the
German “Ehegatte” as either a sophisticated term for the male “Ehemann” or as the
gender-neutral legal term for “einer der beiden Partner einer Ehe”) Coniuge,
DIZITALIANO, http://dizionari.corriere.it/dizionario_italiano/C/coniuge.shtml (last
visited Oct. 18, 2015) (defining the Italian “coniuge” in gender neutral terms as the
“ciascuna delle due persone unite in matrimonio”). But see Matrimonio,
DIZITALIANO, http://dizionari.corriere.it/dizionario_italiano/M/matrimonio.shtml (last
visited Sept. 14, 2015) (defining the Italian word “matrimonio” in heteronormative
terms as the official “unione legittima tra un uomo e una donna”).
223
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definitions of marriage that exclude same-sex spouses, even in countries
that recognize same-sex marriage.226
The recent online dictionary definitions may indicate trends and current ordinary meaning, and the older print definitions may help illustrate
the historic intent of the legislators in 2003. Yet, in the end, this dictionary experiment probably reveals less about the plain meaning of “spouse”
in multilingual directives than about when, how, and by whom the dictionaries were last edited.
A comparison of the Family Reunification Directive’s text in different
languages, however, proves more useful in understanding the word
“spouse” as used throughout Article 4 of the directive. A close reading
of the text of Article 4 demonstrates that any meaning of “spouse”
throughout its six paragraphs must be broad enough to encompass all
marriages valid under the law of the jurisdiction where they were formalized;227 the versions in English, French, Spanish, Italian, German and
Dutch support this broad view.228 The text thus seems to implicitly adopt
a choice-of-rule law, based on the place of celebration.
The operative provision provides that “the sponsor’s spouse” is a qualifying “family member,” under the first “compulsory” category of Article
4(1), where member states are required to grant these family members
immigration rights. Then, “spouse” is also used to reference underage
and polygamous “spouse[s]” in the second and third categories for whom
entry and residence is optional or even prohibited.229
Notwithstanding that polygamous marriages are not legally formalized
in any E.U. country, Article 4(4) expressly provides that member states
“shall not authorise” entry and residence for a “further spouse” if the
sponsor “already has a spouse living with him in the territory of the Member State.”230 Thus, the term “spouse” here encompasses spouses who
are not recognized by E.U. member states and even spouses expressly
226 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 328 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “spouse” as “[a]
married woman in relation to her husband; a wife” or “a married man in relation to
his wife; a husband”); COMPACT OXFORD-HACHETTE FRENCH DICTIONARY (Marie
Hélène Corréard & Mary O’Neill eds., Oxford University Press 1995) (defining
“conjoint” as “spouse,” but “conjoints” as “the husband and wife”); DUDEN
DEUTSCHES UNIVERSAL WÖRTERBUCH (Dudenverlag 1989) (defining “Ehegatte” by
reference to the German word for husband, “Ehemann,” defined as “Mann, mit dem
eine Frau verheiratet ist,” i.e., a man who is married to a woman).
227 If it is valid to assume, as the E.C.J. does, that the E.U. legislator is creating a
rationally consistent and complete system in general, it certainly follows that they
would use consistent terminology within the same article of the same directive. See
supra Part III(B).
228 Equivalents to “spouse” are “le conjoint,” “el cónyuge,” “il coniuge,” “dem
Ehegatten,” or “de echtgenoot” respectively.
229 Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, arts. 4(4)-(5). This is also true in
the other language versions described above.
230 Id. (emphasis added). Again, this holds true in each of these language versions.
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denied recognition in the directive. If the meaning of “spouse” is so
broad as to include spouses in these unconventional and invalid marriages, it is broad enough to encompass same-sex spouses in legal Belgian
and Dutch marriages, particularly since the directive does not expressly
deny them coverage.
“Spouse” is also used to describe underage married individuals. Article 4(5) permits member states to decide whether or not to “require the
sponsor and his/her spouse to be of a minimum age.”231 Here, the directive applies the term “spouse” in the context of marriages that were presumably legal where they were formalized but are conditionally exempt
from the directive’s recognition requirements. Again, such a broadly
defined term would also cover spouses in legal same-sex marriages, who
were not singled out for exceptional treatment under the directive.
Thus, a broad reading of the word “spouse” to include same-sex
spouses is the only one possible that is internally consistent throughout
the text of the directive. “Spouse” must encompass any legal marriage,
valid where it was celebrated, including those for which the directive
carves out specific policy-based exceptions (since polygamous marriages
are not valid in E.U. member states, the directive is clearly applying the
term “spouse” to include marriages not entered into, or generally recognized, in the Union).232
231

Id. art 4(5). Again, this holds true in the other language versions examined.
One might wonder whether this textual argument proves too much. In addition
to requiring that all member states recognize same-sex spouses under the directive, it
also supports the conclusion that a first spouse in a polygamous marriage must be
granted entry and residence. While the directive expressly prohibits authorization of
a “further spouse” if “the sponsor already has a spouse living with him in the territory
of a Member State,” the plain language of Article 4(1)(a) appears to grant a sponsor
the right to reunification with one of his several spouses if he does not yet have a
spouse living in the E.U. There is support for this argument in the directive’s
legislative history as well. See infra Part IV(B)(3). The E.C.J. has not yet ruled on
this question, but it raises some disturbing possibilities. For instance, if a husband
could unilaterally decide which of his several wives to sponsor, that would appear to
undermine the protection of women, which is an express rationale for Article 4(4) of
the directive. See Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, recital 11 (justifying
“possible . . . restrictive measures against applications for family reunification of
polygamous households” on the basis of “the values and principles recognised by the
Member States, in particular with respect to the rights of women and of children”).
Perhaps, the other methods of interpretation are necessary in order to best interpret
the coverage of a first polygamous “spouse” in light of the conflict between the
directive’s stated desiderata and its operative provisions. There is no such conflict
within the directive regarding the marriages of same-sex spouses. The recitals in the
preamble actually reinforce a broad interpretation of the term “spouse” in Article 4,
which encompasses married same-sex couples, and recognition of lesbian marriages
protects “the rights of women” who choose to marry other women in the same way
that traditional one-man polygamy arguably undermines those rights. See id. recital
232
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Because the Family Reunification Directive is so comprehensive and so
detailed (even differentiating among the polygamous spouses and their
children), it is logical to infer that same-sex spouses must be covered
somewhere within its scheme. The choice seems to be between classifying
a same-sex spouse either as a “spouse” or as a de facto or registered partner. Yet there is no reference to same-sex spouses in the detailed discussion “of unmarried partners . . . in a duly attested stable long-term
relationship, or . . . bound . . . by a registered partnership.”233 This omission suggests that a spouse is still a “spouse,” regardless of the gender of
his or her partner. Moreover, the E.C.J. has held that a partner does not
qualify as a “spouse” under E.U. provisions even if her status has effects
similar to marriage under a member state’s law.234 The reverse inference
applies here – that a “spouse” is not a “registered partner” since each
term in the separate provisions of the directive must mean something specific and different.
Finally, the directive’s procedure for adjudicating family reunification
cases tends to support the inclusion of same-sex spouses. Article 5(2)
states that “[t]he application shall be accompanied by documentary evidence of the family relationship and of compliance with the conditions
laid down in Article 4 [defining ‘family members’] and 6 [individual ‘public policy’ exceptions].”235 There is no reference to proof of the spouses’
sex; it only requires valid documentation of a legal marriage, which would
be identical for same- and different-sex spouses. Thus, a host member
state cannot object that a spouse is not a “family member” under Article
4(1) so long as the couple presents documentation that they are legally
married.236
There are some counterarguments under the textual and systematic
approaches. The recitals in the preamble of the directive include references to the “proper compliance with the values and principles
recognised by Member States” and to the proper refusal of family reunification to a “person . . . [who] constitute[s] a threat to public policy or
public security.”237 These recitals seem to invite member states to refuse
permission for same-sex spouses to migrate on the grounds of “values and
11. Same-sex marriage also supports the rights of the children of same-sex spouses.
See id.
233 Id. art. 4(3).
234 Case C-59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. I-01283, ¶ 15; Joined Cases C122/99 P and C-125/99 P, D. & Sweden v. Council of the European Union, 2001
E.C.R. I-4319, ¶ 34. See also ELSPETH GUILD, STEVE PEERS & JONATHAN TOMKIN,
THE EU CITIZENS DIRECTIVE: A COMMENTARY 33-34 (2014).
235 See Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, arts. 4, 5(2), 6.
236 The host member state could, however, still investigate whether a particular
relationship is a fraudulent “marriage of convenience.” See id. art. 16(4). This is also
clarified in the second paragraph of Article 5(2).
237 Id. recitals 11, 14.
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principles” or “public policy.” Yet the context of these provisions undermines any such reading.
The “values and principles” reference appears in the context of
“respect for the rights of women and children” and the restriction of
polygamous households “in particular.”238 It opens the door to non-textual considerations discussed in Subparts (C) and (D) below, but does not
change our textual analysis at this point. Although the term “public policy” could arguably affect the categorization of same-sex spouses, the
Family Reunification Directive is clearly using it in reference to dangerous individuals, not to categorical groups of eligible family members. Not
only does the provision specify that “the person” — not the familial
group — “should not constitute a threat to public policy or public security,” but it also lists examples of individual types for public policy consideration, such as a person with a “conviction for committing a serious
crime” or a member or supporter of an organization that “supports terrorism . . . or has extremist aspirations.”239
In the context of otherwise clear, comprehensive, and detailed legislation, the unqualified classification of “spouse[s]” within the list of family
members member states “shall authorise” indicates that legal same-sex
spouses should be covered. This interpretation is reinforced by the
E.C.J.’s understanding that exceptions “are to be interpreted strictly so
that general rules are not negated.”240 Additionally, same-sex spouses
could have been categorized along with polygamous spouses who are
denied immigration benefits or with “partners” whose benefits are
optional, but because “same-sex spouses” are not discussed in Article
4(3), it makes sense to include them as “spouse[s]” under Article 4(1)(a),
rather than to infer their exclusion from the directive’s general
recognition.
While the arguments above are confirmed in the six languages
examined in this Article, that fact would not be sufficient for the E.C.J. to
stop its analysis at the text of Article 4. Because of the principle of multilingual equality, a definitive textual analysis must explore all of the official languages of the Union and determine that the textual conclusion
follows without ambiguity in every case, a demanding task.241 Yet multilingual text-based analyses like those above can still be convincing if their
conclusions are consistent with those of other methods of interpretation.
238

Id. recital 11.
Id. recital 14.
240 Case C-346/08, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2010 E.C.R. I-03491, ¶ 39; Case
C-476/01, Germany v. Kapper, 2004 E.C.R. I-5205, ¶ 72. Of course, the requirement
of spousal recognition would not be entirely negated if same-sex spouses were not
included, but reading an implied exception into the rule in this case would be a very
broad reading indeed.
241 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 59.
239
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2. The Text of the Citizens Directive
The Citizens Directive defines “family member” to include the
following:
(a) the spouse;
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State,
if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions
laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State;
(c) the direct descendants [sic] who are under the age of 21 or are
dependants [sic] and those of the spouse or partner defined in point
(b); [and]
(d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of
the spouse or partner as defined in point (b)[.]242
This single category for mandatory recognition includes legally registered partners in an E.U. member state whose relationships are
“equivalent to marriage” under the law of the host member state.
The second provision above incorporates a choice-of-law element into
the definition of qualifying “registered partner[s],” — which ensures a
single, uniform Union-wide rule by deferring to the host member state
law in these politically sensitive situations. “[T]he spouse,” by contrast, is
simply deemed a qualifying “family member,” without any modifying
conditions about a host member state or about a choice-of-law. This
silence seems to indicate rejection of a host-state choice-of-law for
“spouse(s).” But this omission does not inform us whether to apply a
different choice-of-law rule based on the member state of celebration or
nationality or to adopt an autonomous E.U. definition.
One view suggests an autonomous heterosexual E.U. definition of
“spouse,” relegating same-sex spouses to the separate paragraph covering
“registered partner[s]” whose relationships are “equivalent to marriage”
in the host member state.243 Certainly, same-sex marriages are
“equivalent to marriage,” but describing a legal marriage as a “registered
partnership equivalent to marriage” would reflect bizarre and circular
drafting that leads to absurd results: read literally, Article 2(b) would
require recognition of same-sex foreign spouses in Germany, which
authorizes marriage-like same-sex registered partnerships, but not in
Sweden, which recognizes same-sex marriages, but not marriage-like registered partnerships.244
242

Citizens Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
See supra Introduction.
244 See Joined cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P, D & Sweden v. Council of the
European Union, 2001 E.C.R. I-4319, ¶ 36; see also Scott Titshaw, The Reactionary
Road to Free Love: How DOMA, State Marriage Amendments, and Social
Conservatives Undermine Traditional Marriage, 115 W.VA. L. REV. 205, 300 (2012)
243
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While the legislative history described below supports the view that this
text was left intentionally ambiguous, the text actually supports the inclusion of same-sex spouses as “spouse[s].” Here, the interpretive cannon of
effet utile — the rule against redundancy — is useful.245 The Citizens
Directive defines “family member” to include both “the spouse” and the
registered partner, if the partnership is based on the legislation of a member state and if the host member state “treats registered partnerships as
equivalent to marriage.”246 If the term “registered partnerships” encompasses marriages, that would apply equally to both same- and differentsex marriages, and any different-sex marriage clearly would be treated
“as the equivalent to marriage in all E.U. Member States.” Thus, the
provision for “registered partners” under Article 2(2) would provide full
recognition of all different-sex spouses as “family members,” and the provision for “the spouse” would be redundant (unless it included same-sex
spouses). Of course, this is not the best reading of the directive, but it is
the logical extension of classifying any spouse as a “registered partner”
rather than a “spouse” when that is an available option.
Finally, the E.U.’s “harmonious interpretation” principle encourages
an inclusive reading of the Citizens Directive. Interpreting “spouse” to
exclude married same-sex couples would undermine the primary European Treaty guarantees of free movement, the right to marry and found a
family, the right to family life, and protection against sex or sexual orientation based discrimination.247 Thus, the new textual innovations in the
Citizens Directive support the same broad definition of “spouse” as the
text of the Family Reunification Directive does. This conclusion is amplified by the contextual desirability of a unified meaning for the same term
in both directives as discussed below.248
3. Combining the Directives in a Broader Context
To recap some of the points in Parts I(A) and I(B), two overarching
purposes of both Family Migration Directives are to protect the fundamental right to free movement of persons within the E.U. and the right to
family unification.249 The directives were also written to achieve their
closely related objectives in similar ways: they each define a class of fam(listing Sweden among those countries discontinuing same-sex-only registered
partnerships after adopting marriage equality).
245 See supra Part III(B).
246 Citizens Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(2).
247 See infra Part IV(C). See also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights]; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7 & 9,
Dec. 18, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights].
248 See infra Part IV(A)(3).
249 Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, recitals 2, 3, 6.
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ily members, including spouses and dependents, entitled to enter and
reside in E.U. member states under certain, fairly liberal conditions, and
they define minimum standards for procedural and substantive regulations related to these rights.
Viewed in combination, the closely aligned purposes and regulatory
strategies of the two directives lead to the view that they should be interpreted together. When the directives rely on the single undefined word
“spouse,” it makes sense to treat the term in the same way unless there is
a clear reason not to. In this case, there appears to be no such reason. As
described above, textual and systematic analyses of the directives
together militate in favor of an autonomous E.U. definition of the word
“spouse.” The rest of this Article will utilize the other methods of directive interpretation to determine whether they confirm that conclusion or
favor a different rule.
B. Historical Analysis: “Constructive Ambiguity” as Legislative Intent
European legislators should have been aware that the unqualified term
“spouse” could incorporate same-sex couples legally married in E.U.
member states when they enacted the Family Migration Directives in
2003 and 2004, soon after Belgium and Ontario, Canada, had joined the
Netherlands in recognizing marriage equality for same-sex couples.250 In
Belgium, in particular, where the Family Reunification Directive was
signed by the Council President, same-sex marriage was a prominent
topic in the news.251 In this context, the Commission, Council, and Parliament must have been aware that the word “spouse” included same-sex
husbands and wives in two E.U. member states.252
The legislative history below indicates that legislators were indeed
aware of the increasingly inclusive meaning of marriage, given the lively
debates on this issue, but both directives are silent on this point. The only
clear conclusion is that legislators “agreed to disagree,” accepting constructive ambiguity as a way to conclude their work on the directives and
leaving the gaps in the directives for the E.C.J. to fill at a later date.
1. E.C.J. Case Law Preceding Enactment of the Family Migration
Directives
The position that the drafters of the Citizens Directive intended to
exclude married same-sex couples from the term “spouse” seems to be
250

See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Homohuwelijk in Staatsblad, DE STANDAARD (Mar. 1, 2003), http://
www.standaard.be/cnt/dst01032003_018 (describing the publication of the new law
and the wait to see who will be the first same-sex couple to marry in Belgium).
252 Thanks to Kees Waaldijk for pointing out this timeline during a session of the
Rights on the Move Conference in Trento, Italy.
251
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based, in part, on the E.C.J.’s prior case law on this subject.253 According
to this argument, the Commission relied on E.C.J. case law indicating
“that marriage did not cover persons of the same-sex” as shown by its
initial report on the directives, which relied heavily on the Court’s caselaw in “other areas of E.U. law – such as employment law and E.U. staff
[r]egulations – which concerned non-marital partnerships.”254 Yet the
Commission did not cite any of the E.C.J. cases to define the meaning of
“spouse,” let alone to exclude same-sex spouses.255 This comparative
omission indicates that the proposal was not specifically incorporating
any E.C.J. definition of “spouse.”
Considering, however, that the Commission was likely aware of E.C.J.
case law when it drafted the directives, a review of the meaning of
“spouse” in case law is an important reference point. Yet it is also important to note that the cases were all decided before same-sex marriage
gained traction in many member states, and none of these cases regard
the status of legally married same-sex spouses. This jurisprudence only
clearly confirms one point: the need for a uniform E.U. treatment of
“spouses.”256
The notable E.C.J. case of D and Sweden v. Council involved a European official in a limited same-sex Swedish registered partnership,257 who
253

GUILD ET AL., supra note 234, at 35-36; Jorrit Rijpma & Nelleke Koffeman,
Chapter 20 - Free Movement Rights for Same-Sex Couples Under EU Law: What Role
to Play for the CJEU?, in SAME-SEX COUPLES BEFORE NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 455, 468 (Daniele Gallo, Luca Paladini & Pietro
Pustorino eds., 2014).
254 Rijpma & Koffeman, supra note 253, at 468.
255 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Right of
Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely Within
the Territory of the Member States, COM(2001)257 Final (May 23, 2001) [hereinafter
Original Citizens Directive Proposal].
256 Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986
E.C.R. I-01283 (“all the parties agree that the term ‘spouse’ has a specific meaning in
Community law”) (emphasis in original); id. at Judgment, ¶¶ 13, 15; Joined Cases C122/99 P and C-125/99 P, D. & Sweden v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-4319, ¶11. These
cases have sometimes employed a comparative approach to member state and Union
law, see Case C-59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. I-01283, ¶13 (because “an
interpretation given by the Court . . . has effects in all of the [M]ember [S]tates . . . any
interpretation of a legal term on the basis of social developments must take into
account the situation in the whole community”), but textual, historical and
teleological methods may be more important in interpreting the Family Migration
Directives. See Joined Cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P, D & Sweden v. Council,
2001 E.C.R. I-4319, ¶ 11 (“reference to the laws of the Member States is not
necessary where the relevant provisions of the Staff Regulations are capable of being
given an independent interpretation”).
257 Joined Cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P, D & Sweden v. Council, 2001 E.C.R.
I-4319, ¶ 3 (a “registered partnership shall have the same legal effects as a marriage,
subject to the exceptions provided for”).
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demanded the monetary household allowance specifically granted to
“married official[s]” under the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities (the “Staff Regulations”).258 As an initial matter, the
Court stated that “according to the definition generally accepted by the
Member States, the term ‘marriage’ means a union between two persons
of the opposite sex”259 — a statement that came only one month after the
Netherlands authorized the modern world’s first legal same-sex
marriages.
However, the E.C.J. also pointed out that “[i]t is equally true that since
1989 an increasing number of Member States have introduced, alongside
marriage, statutory arrangements granting legal recognition in various
forms of union between partners of the same sex or of the opposite sex”
with some of “the same or comparable [effects] to those of marriage.”260
At that point in time, the Court’s description of the heterosexual meaning
of marriage was merely a statement of fact, not a legal, autonomous definition for the E.U. Even if the E.C.J. had intended such a definition, its
statement would have been non-binding obiter dicta, since it was unnecessary to decide that question.
In light of these two considerations, the E.C.J. found “that it is not the
sex of the partner which determines whether the household allowance is
granted, but the legal nature of the ties between the official and the partner.”261 In this case, “registered relationships . . . [were] regarded in
[Sweden] as being distinct from marriage.”262 Staff Regulations granted a
household allowance “only to married couples,” not to relationships or
“situations distinct from marriage.”263 Therefore, the holding in D and
Sweden was that same- or different-sex “registered partners” were not
included within the meaning of “spouse” under the Staff Regulations.264
Another seminal case was Netherlands v. Reed.265 Similar to D and
Sweden, Reed concerned the distinction between marriages and other
legally recognized forms of partnerships, not the distinction between
same- and different-sex couples. In Reed, the E.C.J. held that absent
“any indication to the contrary in the regulation, . . . the term ‘spouse’ in
[a worker migration regulation superseded by the Citizens Directive]
refers to a marital relationship only.”266 “Spouse” need not cover a dif258

Id. ¶ 4.
Id ¶ 34.
260 Id. ¶ 35.
261 Id. ¶ 47.
262 Id. ¶ 36 (understandably failing to consider the new Dutch marriage regime,
which only came into effect a month before the decision was published).
263 Id. ¶¶ 37, 40.
264 Id.
265 Case C-59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. I-01283.
266 Id. ¶15.
259
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ferent-sex unmarried and unregistered cohabitant in a stable
relationship.267
A case that did focus on the difference between same- and differentsex unmarried de facto partners, however, was Grant v. South-West Trains
Ltd., an employment case.268 In Grant, the E.C.J. concluded that the
European Community Treaty and the directive on equal pay for men and
women did not require equal benefits for unmarried same- and differentsex couples in stable relationships.269 While Grant’s justification for discrimination initially appears to be a promising precedent for defining
“spouses” to exclude same-sex married couples, it is not persuasive for
several reasons.
Not only is Grant not on point since it did not pertain to “spouses” of
either gender, but it has also been undermined by subsequent E.C.J. decisions and other legal advances.270 Only two years after Grant was
decided, the E.U. adopted its Charter of Fundamental Rights (“Charter”), which expressly prohibits “any discrimination based on any ground
such as sex . . . or sexual orientation.”271 The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 also
amended the primary E.U. treaties to make the Charter binding and to
expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.272 In
addition, the Lisbon Treaty commenced a process for E.U. accession to
the European Convention on Human Rights, which mandates equality
for same-sex couples under non-marital partnership schemes for different-sex couples.273 The recitals in the Family Migration Directives simi-

267

Id. ¶ 16. In the end, the E.C.J. recognized a right to join the migrant worker in
Reed under other provisions of the 1968 regulation and the European Community
Treaty because member states must provide the unmarried companions of migrant
workers covered by the treaty with social advantages equal with those provided to the
companions of their own nationals. Id. ¶¶ 28-30.
268 Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-621, ¶ 35.
269 Id.
270 See, e.g., Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen,
2008 E.C.J. I-01757 (requiring survivor benefits to registered life partner where
partner legally comparable to spouse).
271 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 247, art. 21(1).
272 See The First International Treaty Banning Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Comes Into Force Today, ILGA EUROPE (Jan. 12, 2009), http://old.ilga-europe.org/
home/news/for_media/media_releases/the_first_international_treaty_banning_sexual
_orientation_discrimination_comes_into_force_today_the_treaty_of_lisbon.
273 See Vallianatos & Others v. Greece, App. Nos. 29381/09 & 32684/09, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2013); Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). The
European Court of Human Rights has held that sexual orientation based
discrimination is subject to heightened scrutiny under the European Convention on
Human Rights, requiring “particularly serious reasons” as justification. Karner v.
Austria, App. No. 40016/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 37 (2003).
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larly instruct implementation without discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.274
The Commission has been inconsistent in its interpretation of the word
“spouse.” It clarified that it would not recognize married same-sex
couples as “spouse[s]” in enforcing the laws that preceded the directives.275 Then, regarding the Citizens Directive, the Commission first
indicated that it was intended to cover same-sex married couples as
“spouse[s],” but later indicated it did not, at least temporarily.276 The
Commission seemed clear on three points though: that the E.U. requires
a uniform rule or definition of “spouse,” that the E.C.J. had not yet settled the question, and that the subject area has been in flux and is subject
to change.277
2. Shifting Legislative Procedures Required to Enact Each
Directive
Determining the specific intent of the enacting legislator requires particular attention in the case of the Family Migration Directives, because
the E.U. and its legislative processes changed dramatically while they
were being debated and enacted. The European Community had become
the European Union, and the Union expanded its membership from fifteen to twenty-five member states in October 2004. In anticipation of this
expansion, the Treaty of Nice divided the responsibility and changed the
relevant process from the exclusive domain of a unanimous Council to a
shared decision, requiring assent of the Parliament and a qualified majority of Council votes.278 The Commission retained control of proposing
and drafting legislation.
Accordingly, the 2003 Family Reunification Directive was enacted
under the former process, and approved by the Council alone, by unanimous vote, after the proposal by the Commission and consultation with
274 See Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, recital 5; Citizens Directive,
supra note 3, recital 31.
275 Communication from the Commission: Free movement of workers – Achieving
the Full Benefits and Potential, COM(2002)694 Final 8 (Dec. 12, 2002) [hereinafter
Communication on Worker Movement].
276 See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text (describing the Commission’s
original understanding that same-sex spouses were covered as “spouse[s]”). See also
infra notes 313-14 and accompanying text (describing the Commission’s later
position).
277 See Communication on Worker Movement, supra note 275, at 8; Amended
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Right of
Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely Within
the Territory of the Member States, COM(2003)199 Final 3 [hereinafter Commission’s
Response to Parliament’s Proposed Amendments].
278 HELEN TONER, PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS, FREE MOVEMENT, AND EU LAW 61, 6970 (2004).
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the Parliament and other E.U. actors.279 On the other hand, the Citizens
Directive, which was enacted only seven months later, was enacted by
both the Council and the Parliament, but with lower thresholds for
approval.280 The legislative histories below reflect these shifting procedural requirements and explain their implications on the political realities
for the various European institutions.
3. Legislative Intent Behind the Family Reunification Directive
The Commission’s initial draft of the Family Reunification Directive
broadly encompassed same- and different-sex couples, whether they were
married, registered partners, or simply living in marriage-like unregistered de facto partnerships.281 This early draft would have required member states to “authorize entry and residence” of “the applicant’s spouse,
or an unmarried partner living in a durable relationship with the applicant, if the legislation of the Member State concerned treats the situation
of unmarried couples as corresponding to that of married couples.”282 As
in the final version of the directive, the language in the initial draft did
not expressly delineate whether same-sex spouses would be covered automatically as spouses or would be covered only in member states that
“treat unmarried couples” as “corresponding to” spouses.283 The term
“unmarried” in the initial draft nevertheless set up a dichotomy in which
same-sex spouses could not aptly fall under the latter category.
The Commission’s report on the initial draft of the Family Reunification Directive (“Report”) did not directly address the issue of same-sex
spouses. It merely described the operative provision concerning “the
applicant’s spouse, or his unmarried partner (who may be of the same
sex).”284 In light of the comma before “or” and the omission of a parallel
reference to “spouse[s],” of the same-sex, the Commission did not
appear to have contemplated the possibility of same-sex marriage in E.U.
member states. This is unsurprising since the Report was drafted two
years before the Netherlands became the first country in the world to
authorize same-sex marriage.285 In that context, the Report shows that
the Commission intended equality of same- and different-sex couples
with regard to existing institutions.
Equal treatment of same-sex spouses is also supported by more general
comments in the Report. For instance, the Report emphasized that it is
“indispensable” for legal residents to be united with their families “if
these people are to lead a normal family life and [this] will help them to
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

Id. at 70.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 70-71.
Council’s Family Reunification Proposal, supra note 17, at 26.
Id.
Id. at 14.
See Wet openstelling huwelijk, Stb. 2001 (Neth.).
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integrate into society in the Member States.”286 Lesbian, gay or bisexual
spouses would seem no less able than other legal residents to be without
family support to lead a normal family life in their new home, especially
in societies that are less than welcoming.
As previously discussed, the Commission also expressed two goals for
harmonizing member state legislation on family reunification for legal
residents: (1) that non-citizens should “be eligible for broadly the same
family reunification conditions, irrespective of the Member State in which
they are admitted for residence purposes”; and (2) that immigrants’
choice of a member state in which to reside should not be based on the
member state’s laws and its “more generous terms offered.”287 As the
Commission stated, both of these goals serve “to establish a right to family reunification that can be exercised in accordance with common criteria
in all Member States” and to “improve certainty as to the law for thirdcountry nationals.”288
Both of these rationales support the conclusion that the Commission
originally intended Union-wide recognition of valid same-sex marriages.
Though later versions of the directive expressly rejected mandatory harmonization regarding unmarried partners, the underlying intent for
“spouse[s]” remained intact. The Commission was so concerned with the
importance of family unity that it even wanted to cover polygamous marriages in some contexts. Although it found such marriages were “not
generally compatible with the fundamental principles of the Member
States’ legal orders,” it explained that an “absolute prohibition on family
reunification” for polygamous spouses “would have the effect of depriving the spouse residing in a Member States of the possibility of leading a
normal family life.”289 This observation justified the directive’s prohibition of “reunification of several spouses” but not “the reunification of
one spouse and her children.”290
When it consulted with the Council on this draft, the Economic and
Social Committee clearly understood the directive to be “designed . . . to
establish a harmonised framework for exercising” the right to family
reunification, and “determin[e] to whom the right would apply” among
other things.291 The Committee applauded the extension of rights to
unmarried couples and suggested that the Commission monitor the
implementation of the directive to ensure that “[r]estrictive interpreta286

Council’s Family Reunification Proposal, supra note 17, at 9, ¶7.2.
Id. at 9, ¶7.4.
288 Id. at 11, ¶ 9.3.
289 Id. at 15.
290 Id. The referenced section of the draft survived substantively intact in Article
4(3) of the final directive.
291 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council
Directive on the Right to Family Reunification,’ 2000 O.J. (C 204) 40, 40.
287
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tions are . . . avoided.”292 Thus, the Commission’s intent here, combined
with the Committee’s approval, supports the broad reading of “spouse”
in the directive to include all couples whose marriages were valid where
celebrated.293
4. Legislative Intent Behind the Citizens Directive
The Commission’s original draft of the Citizens Directive encompassed
a fairly broad understanding of family. Article 2(2) defined “family
member” to include “(a) the spouse; [or] (b) the unmarried partner, if the
legislation of the host Member State treats unmarried couples as
equivalent to married couples.”294 The Explanatory Memorandum
accompanying the original draft stated that the directive was “broadening
the definition of ‘family member,’” presumably referring to the inclusion
of “unmarried partners” as well as “spouses.”295
The drafters originally intended to treat married same-sex couples as
“spouses,” not as “unmarried partners,” as clarified during the first reading of that draft to the responsible committee in the Council. At that
time, the Italian representative specifically asked whether “a homosexual
couple legally married in the M[ember] S[tate] of origin would . . . be
regarded as a spouse (point (a)) or as an unmarried partner (point (b)) in
the host M[ember] S[tate].”296 The Commission representative
responded, “this case would be covered by point (a).”297 Thus, the Commission initially believed same-sex spouses were covered as “spouse[s]”
under Article 2(2)(a).
The Explanatory Memorandum further indicated the Commission’s
awareness that the draft “intended not only to accommodate the case-law
of the [E.C.J.] and acknowledge changes in the law of the Member States,
but also to facilitate the free movement of Union citizens by eliminating
any possibility of family reunification reasons having a negative influence.”298 As discussed in Part IV(C) below, this explanation supports the
Commission’s original intent to recognize a liberal understanding of
“family member” which included same-sex “spouse[s]” under Article
2(2)(a), and also demonstrates that the Commission was consciously
going beyond the E.C.J.’s understanding of family in its original draft of
the directive.
The Council’s Working Party on Free Movement of Persons conducted
a second reading of the draft directive in mid-2002. Five members of the
292

Id. at 42.
See supra Part IV(A).
294 Original Citizens Directive Proposal, supra note 255, at 29.
295 Id. at 4, ¶ 2.4.
296 Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 2001/0111 (COD), No.
15380/01, 7 n.5 (Dec. 18, 2001).
297 Id.
298 Original Citizens Directive Proposal, supra note 255, at 4, ¶ 2.4.
293
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working party then lodged scrutiny reservations to Article 2(2)(a), asserting that “a homosexual spouse should only be admitted to the host
M[ember] S[tate] on that basis if the host M[ember] S[tate]’s legislation
provided for such marriages.”299 Nine members recorded reservations to
the reference to “unmarried partner” in the original draft of Article
2(2)(b).300 In response, the Commission representative promised to work
on the wording that governed partners in subparagraph (b).301
In deciding where to place same-sex spouses, “[i]t was suggested either
that reference be made in [subparagraph](a) to the host M[ember]
S[tate]’s law or . . . to heterosexual spouses only and homosexual spouses
be dealt with in [subparagraph](b).”302 The Commission and several
delegations expressed a preference for the latter alternative, of placing
same-sex spouses under the “partnership” category, but neither suggestion made its way into the text of subparagraph (a), which remained
unchanged throughout the legislative process.
The Union Presidency tried to resolve outstanding issues after the second reading and posed specific questions to the working party, including
the linguistically tortured query of whether “same-sex spouses [should]
be covered by the concept of spouses.”303 After discussing this issue further, “[a] large number” of delegations wanted to leave the issue up to
national law.304 The Commission representative suggested a revision to
“delete reference to ‘unammarried’ [sic] partners [in subparagraph (b)],
in order to clarify that this point include[s] all other partners besides heterosexual spouses, and with a reference to the host M[ember] S[tates’]
national legislation regarding the recognition of the couples (including
homosexual partners).”305 Two delegations suggested an alternative of
including “a separate point relating to homosexual registered partnerships and . . . spouses.”306
In the Parliament, things went differently. The responsible committee
rejected its chairman’s proposed amendment, which relied on D and Swe299

Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 2001/0111 (COD), No.
10572/02, 11 n.15 (July 10, 2002), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
srv?l=en&f=st%2010572%202002%20INIT (Germany, Greece, Spain, Ireland and
Italy) [hereinafter Council Doc. Dated July 10, 2002].
300 Id. at 11 n.16 (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Netherlands,
Portugal and Austria).
301 Id.
302 Id. at 11 n.5.
303 Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 2001/0111 (COD), No.
10571/02, 2 (July 4, 2002), http://www.europa-nu.nl/9353000/1/j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j
9vvj9idsj04xr6/vi7jgstawnyh.
304 Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 2001/0111 (COD), No.
12519/02, 4 (Sept. 30, 2002), http://www.europa-nu.nl/9353000/1/j4nvgs5kjg27kof_
j9vvj9idsj04xr6/vi7jgstjz9xp.
305 Id.
306 Id. (Spain and the Netherlands).
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den to clarify the still unclear language of Article 2(2) by limiting the
definition of “spouse” to different-sex spouses.307 Instead, the committee, and later the Parliament, adopted an affirmative position paper
returning the directive with an amendment to clarify that “family member” includes a “spouse” or “registered partner” “irrespective of sex,
according to the relevant national legislation” and “the unmarried partner, if the legislation or practice of the host and/or home Member State
treats unmarried couples . . . and married couples in a corresponding
manner.”308
The Commission did not accept the Parliament’s broad definition of
“family member,” leaving Article 2(2) as it was after the Council’s last
changes.309 The final version defines “family member” to include “(a)
the spouse; [or] (b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member
State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage.”310 Subparagraph (a) was left entirely
unchanged from the original draft, but subparagraph (b) underwent several changes. Most significantly, the final text replaced “unmarried partner” with “partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a
registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State,”
and replaced “unmarried couples as equivalent to married couples” with
“registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage.”
The two deletions of “unmarried” could be read to extend the meaning
of “partners” in subparagraph (b) to also cover same-sex spouses. Yet
such an intent is not obvious in this regard, as these deletions also were
clearly necessary to accomplish other intended objectives. In particular,
they served to reduce the obligation of member states to “facilitate”
under Article 3(2)(b), for “unmarried partners,” an even more controversial category of relationships, and to also ensure that only registered partnerships “contracted” in E.U. member states, not third countries, would
307

TONER, supra note 278, at 64.
Id. at 64-65. Position of the European Parliament Adopted at First Reading on
11 February 2003, file EP-PE_TC1-COD(2001)0111, (Feb. 11, 2003) at 10, 42, 46.
Although the amendment included no express choice-of-law to determine the
“relevant national legislation,” the Commission clearly understood the reference here
to be to the member state of celebration or registration. Commission’s Response to
Parliament’s Proposed Amendments, supra note 277, at 3 (“Parliament’s amendments
would recognise as family members the spouse of the same sex in the same way as the
spouse of a different sex, the registered partner in accordance with the legislation of
the [Member State] of origin, and the non-married partners in accordance with the
legislation or practice of the host or home [Member State].”).
309 Commission’s Response to Parliament’s Proposed Amendments, supra note 277,
at 3.
310 Citizens Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(2) (emphasis added to indicate additions
to the original draft).
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be covered.311 If the reformulation of Article 2(2)(b) was meant to
include same-sex spouses as the Commission indicated at one point,312
that intent was lost on the Parliament, including the conservative committee chair who subsequently, unsuccessfully tried to clarify the exclusion of
same-sex spouses.313
In rejecting the Parliament’s amendment to liberalize the treatment of
registered and unmarried partners as well as same-sex spouses, the Commission described the final language as “an equitable solution” that
avoids “imposition on certain Member States of amendments to family
law legislation” while allowing “for a possible change in interpretation in
the light of developments in family law in the Member States.”314 The
explanatory report recognized the intentional ambiguity and the resulting
flexibility of the final wording of Article 2(2), whose meaning could one
day change if there was a sufficient Union-wide trend of legal recognition
of marriage equality (or possibly even of marriage alternatives).315 Yet
the Commission seemed reconciled for the time being with an interpretation of “spouse” that effectively excluded migrating same-sex couples —
an interpretation which was not clear, even to the Parliament.
In conclusion, the legislative history does not demonstrate a single legislative intent regarding the meaning of “spouse” in the Citizens Directive. Although many member state delegations in the Council did not
want to recognize same-sex spouses or same- or different-sex unmarried
partners even for the limited purpose of accompanying migrating E.U.
citizens, they were unable to amend the directive to establish a definite,
exclusively heterosexual definition of “spouse.” As both the Council and
the Parliament were required to enact this directive, the latter of which
held the opposite, broader and more flexible view of “spouse” the text
appears to have been left intentionally ambiguous — reflecting the institutions’ willingness to “agree to disagree” (or perhaps, their desire for
finality and reluctance to restart negotiations on this directive to include
311

See Council Doc. Dated July 10, 2002, supra note 299, at 11 (indicating that
more states objected to the language of subparagraph (b), which was amended to
move unmarried couples to the nonobligatory provision in Article 3(2)(b) relating to
partners with whom Union citizens have “durable relationship[s], duly attested,” than
to that of subparagraph (a)).
312 See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
313 See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
314 Commission’s Response to Parliament’s Proposed Amendments, supra note 277,
at 3. Here it appears to assume member states can only recognize married same-sex
couples from other member states as “spouse[s]” under the directive if they amend
their family law. This, of course, would be false if the Union adopted an autonomous
E.U. meaning of “spouse” in the Family Migration Directives.
315 This definitional approach seems to borrow from the “margin of appreciation”
idea employed by the European Court of Human Rights when determining what
rights are fundamental based on the common constitutional traditions of European
countries.
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the ten new member states316), and leaving the final decision on this point
to the E.C.J. and other courts.
C. Teleological Analysis: Furthering the Purposes of Equality, Family
Unity, and Free Movement Within a Borderless Union
Many of the same primary goals underlie the Family Reunification
Directive, the Citizens Directive, and their predecessor legislation from
the early 1960s, as well as the E.U. constitutional order: freedom of
movement within a borderless Union territory, protection of family and
respect for family life, and equality, now including prohibitions of discrimination on the bases of sex and sexual orientation.
According to Article 26 of the consolidated Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (“T.F.E.U.”), a fundamental goal of the Union is
to ensure “the free movement of . . . persons” by developing an area
“without internal frontiers,”317 thus it established a common E.U. framework for “asylum, immigration, and external border control” policy and
law.318 Article 79 requires adoption of measures regulating the conditions and standards for long-term visas, admission, and residence permits
of third-country nationals, specifically “including those for the purpose of
family reunification.”319 It also implicitly reinforces the scope of the E.U.
authority over family immigration policy, providing that “[t]his Article
shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes of
admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their
territory in order to work, whether employed or self-employed.”320 It
follows that, apart from the express exception for volume of direct workbased immigration of third-country nationals to an E.U. member state,
family-based immigration should be regulated by Union law.
The nexus between the dual goals of freedom of movement and family
reunification underlying the Family Migration Directives was well established long before the Lisbon Treaty clarified and extended them in
2009.321 The 1961 regulation, first providing for free movement of workers, extended migration rights to the worker’s spouse and minor chil316

R

317

R

TONER, supra note 278, at 62.
T.F.E.U., supra note 16, art. 26 (“The internal market shall comprise an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the [t]reaties.”) (emphasis
added).
318 Id. art. 67(2).
319 Id. arts. 79(1)-(2).
320 Id. art. 79(5).
321 Gavin Barrett, Family Matters: European Community Law and Third-Country
Family Members, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 369, 376 (2003). “Family reunification”
was not referenced in the Treaty of Rome initially establishing the E.E.C., the early
predecessor of the E.U.
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dren,322 and the rationale for the rule was based on the reality that
workers would not be willing to move to another country without their
families; without providing these rights to family members of workers,
any entitlement to worker mobility would have probably failed.323 Therefore, the 1961 regulation treated family reunification as a necessary prerequisite for the worker’s freedom of movement, the primary goal.324
The derivative nature of these family benefits was reinforced in the
important 1968 regulation on freedom of movement for workers within
the European Community, which explained that “the right of freedom of
movement, in order that it may be exercised . . . in freedom and dignity,
requires that . . . obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated,
in particular as regards the worker’s right to be joined by his family.”325
Although the early free movement regulations were limited to workers
who were nationals of E.U. member states, the regulation made no
nationality-based distinctions among the workers’ family members.
Third-country national spouses and children were treated the same as
member state citizen family members. This equal treatment exhibits the
derivative nature of family members’ rights — rooted in the interests of
the migrating E.U. workers, not of the accompanying family members.326
The original goal of supporting free movement for the sponsoring primary beneficiaries has persisted beyond the context of worker migration.327 When the Commission introduced the Family Reunification
Directive in 1999, it reiterated that the “integration of the family in the
host country” has been called “the sine qua non [i.e. absolutely necessary]
for the exercise of free movement in objective conditions of freedom and
dignity.”328 The Commission also emphasized that “[t]he rights of family
members are derived rights flowing from those enjoyed by the Union citizen [or legal resident] enjoying the right to free movement,” and the
E.C.J. continues to refer to family-based immigration rights under the
322 Regulation No. 15 on Initial Steps to Provide Freedom of Movement for
Workers within the Community, 1961 O.J. SPEC. ED. (57) 1073, arts. 11-15 (author’s
translation of German original) [hereinafter Regulation No. 15]. See also Kees
Groenendijk, Family Reunification as a Right Under Community Law, 8 EUR. J.
MIGRATION & L. 215, 215 (2006).
323 Barrett, supra note 321, at 376.
324 Regulation No. 15, supra note 322.
325 Council Regulation No. 1612/68 on Freedom of Movement for Workers within
the Community, 1968 O.J. (L 257/2). recital 5 (EC).
326 Barrett, supra note 321, at 376-77.
327 Daniel Thym, EU Migration Policy and its Constitutional Rationale: A
Cosmopolitan Outlook, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 709, 711 (2013) (In E.U. law,
“[l]ike in geology, earlier layers influence the outline and orientation of new
sedimentation.”).
328 Council’s Family Reunification Proposal, supra note 17, at 6 (description in the
European Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum accompanying its original draft
of the Family Reunification Directive).
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Family Migration Directives as “derivative rights.”329 As described in
Part IV(A)(3) above, the recitals in the preambles of the Family Migration Directives incorporate these goals as well.
The Citizens Directive recognizes the “fundamental freedom of movement of persons” within the Union and extends parallel rights to family
members, regardless of nationality.330 The Family Reunification Directive seeks to grant legal residents rights and obligations comparable to
those of citizens and recognizes the concurrent “right to family reunification.”331 It also sees that these measures relate to “the obligation to protect the family and respect family life enshrined in many instruments of
international law,” particularly fundamental rights and “the principles . . .
in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union,”332 whose rights apply to E.U. citizens as
well.
The history of these two interconnected purposes, which can be traced
from the first European Economic Community regulations up to the most
recent E.U. legislation, supports an inclusive understanding of the term
“spouse” in the Family Migration Directives. Under the goals of family
reunification and free movement, a derivative family member’s right is
largely based on the interests of the sponsor. There is no reason to
believe that a sponsoring E.U. citizen or legal resident has a lesser interest in leaving behind her spouse or stepchildren if her spouse is female;
there is no reason to imagine that she loves or feels less responsible for
them. Her duties as a spouse and as a mother are the same as those of a
heterosexual spouse. Thus, recognizing her family’s right to migrate
along with her is as necessary to the sponsor’s freedom of movement as it
is to the sponsor of a different-sex spouse.
A discriminatory reading of the term “spouse” not only undermines
the sponsor’s rights of free movement and family reunification but contravenes the objective of nondiscrimination on the bases of sex and sexual
orientation under the Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and the
preambles of the Family Migration Directives.333 A heterosexual Belgian
329 Id. at 7 (describing family-based rights related to E.U. citizens in the context of
introducing the original version of the Family Reunification Directive); Case C-456/
12, O. v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integatie en Aseiel and Minister voor Immigratie,
Integatie en Aseiel v. B., 2014 E.C.R. 135, ¶ 36 (reiterating that “[a]ny rights
conferred on third-country nationals by provisions of EU law on Union citizenship
are rights derived from the exercise of freedom of movement by a Union citizen”)
(emphasis added).
330 Citizens Directive, supra note 3, recitals 2, 5.
331 Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, recital 3.
332 Id. recital 2. See also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra
note 247, art. 8; Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 247, arts. 7, 9.
333 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 247, art. 21(1) (“Any discrimination
based on any ground such as sex . . . or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”);
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citizen or resident could marry and benefit from the right to move with
her husband to any other E.U. member state. Yet if her sister married
another woman, she and her wife would only be able to move together to
member states that chose to recognize their relationship, unless they
would be “spouse[s]” within the meaning of the Citizens Directive. A
non-inclusive interpretation of “spouse[s]” in the directive would clearly
result in discrimination on the bases of sex and sexual orientation. It
would also undermine the married gay citizen’s freedom of movement,
effectively creating barriers in a supposedly “borderless” E.U. This result
coerces her choice of member state residence, an outcome that the Family
Migration Directives were meant to prevent.334
In the end, a teleological analysis tends to support an understanding of
the term “spouse” which covers same-sex spouses, regardless of whether
one focuses on the narrow goals of the directives alone, the broader goals
of the Treaty provisions on which they were based, or the meta-teleological goals underlying the E.U. system as a whole.
D. Comparative Analysis: Balancing Evolving Family Forms and
Resistant Member State Approaches
As described in Part III(E) above, the E.C.J. sometimes employs comparative analysis of member state laws as one tool in its interpretation of
Union law. With regard to the term “spouse,” there are trends in both
directions, but the stronger current seems to favor the progressive recognition of marriage equality for same-sex couples. Yet the fact that some
member states have strongly embraced anti-gay definitions of marriage
raises the questions of whether and how the E.U. should balance the
strong policy objections of these member states against the Union’s interests in favoring an inclusive definition of marriage as discussed above.
1. Trends and Countertrends in Same-Sex Couple Recognition
E.U. constitutional jurisprudence relies on the comparative constitutional values of member states and evaluates important trends to establish previously unrecognized fundamental E.U. rights.335 The trends
towards marriage equality for same-sex couples have been on the rise,
particularly among longer-term E.U. member states in the western and
northern parts of Europe. Ten member states have already decided to
Family Reunification Directive, supra note 3, recital 5 (“Member States should give
effect to the provisions of this [d]irective without discrimination on the basis of sex . . .
or sexual orientation.”); Citizens Directive, supra note 3, recital 31 (“In accordance
with . . . the Charter [of Fundamental Rights], Member States should implement this
[d]irective without discrimination between the beneficiaries of the [d]irective on
grounds such as sex . . . [o]r sexual orientation.”).
334 See supra Parts IV(B)(3) and IV(C).
335 Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 121, at 16-19.
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legally authorize same-sex marriages.336 Finnish and Slovenian legislatures have also recently passed bills that would soon recognize same-sex
marriage.337 Moreover, several additional member states grant entry and
residence rights to the spouses or registered partners of E.U. citizens on
the basis of partnership recognition.338
On the other hand, the countertrends, against same-sex marriage, are
evident in changes to the constitutions or laws of at least nine countries:
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
and Slovakia.339 At least eleven states, including some of the aforementioned, have implemented the Citizens Directive in ways that are either
unfavorable or unpredictable for same-sex spouses.340 In some of these
countries, same-sex spouses may be recognized for the purposes of derivative immigration, but not under the category of “spouse[s].” Several

336

See Kees Waaldijk, Great Diversity and Some Equality: Non-Marital Legal
Family Formats for Same-Sex Couples in Europe, 1 GENIUS 42, 44 (2014) (listing
Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, United
Kingdom — except for Northern Ireland — and Portugal as nine E.U. countries
authorizing same-sex marriage); Stephen Collins et al., Gay Marriage May be Legal
by September, IRISH TIMES (May 24, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/
same-sex-marriage-may-be-legal-by-september-1.2224563 (describing Irish
referendum to amend Ireland’s Constitution to allow same-sex marriage and the
likelihood of early legislation to complete that change).
337 The Slovenian Parliament voted to enact marriage equality legislation in March
2015, and the Finnish legislature will soon vote again on whether to reaffirm its 2014
vote in favor of marriage equality, but some legal hurdles remain in each country. Joe
Morgan, Finland President Signs Gay Marriage Law, GAYSTARNEWS (Feb. 1, 2015),
http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/finland-president-signs-gay-marriage-lawcouples-will-have-wait-get-married-until-2017200215#sthash.36qpQ4wW.dpuf.
338 See F.R.A. REPORT, supra note 1, at 84 (listing Austria, the Czech Republic,
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Slovenia, and Slovakia).
339 EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HOMOPHOBIA, TRANSPHOBIA AND DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
GENDER IDENTITY: COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS – 2010 UPDATE 46–47 (2010),
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2012/homophobia-transphobia-and-discriminationgrounds-sexual-orientation-and-gender (referencing laws in Bulgaria, Estonia,
Romania, and Slovakia); see also Alina Tryfonidou, Same-Sex Marriage: The EU is
Lagging Behind, in EU LAW ANALYSIS: EXPERT INSIGHT INTO EU LAW
DEVELOPMENTS n.iii (June 29, 2015), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/06/samesex-marriage-eu-is-lagging-behind.html (referencing constitutional same-sex marriage
bans in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia).
340 F.R.A. REPORT, supra note 1, at 82-83 (listing Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece,
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia as refusing to recognize married same-sex
couples as “spouse[s]” although some grant them rights as partners, and describing
the situation in Estonia, Lithuania, Croatia, and Romania as “unclear or
developing”).
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additional states may not recognize spouses or partners under the Family
Reunification Directive.341
On the whole, the stronger trend seems to be the recognition of samesex marriage and of same-sex couples for immigration purposes within
the member states, but the pattern is not entirely clear. The E.C.J. does
not merely tally the number of countries or look solely to trends among
member states when it conducts a comparative analysis. Rather, under its
evaluative method, the E.C.J. is also mindful of the approaches most in
line with the objectives of the E.U. Treaties.342 Here the twin objectives
of family reunification and freedom of movement clearly favor broad recognition of same-sex spouses. More importantly, the comparative
method is not required in order to discover a new, implied fundamental
right in this case of directive interpretation. It should be enough that
interpretation of the directives does not raise a sufficient basis among
member state laws to establish a countervailing right or reason to reject
the results of the textual, systematic, historical and teleological analyses
above.
2. Balancing Union Goals with Member State Interests
In an article from 2010, E.C.J. Vice President Lenaerts opined that the
best reading of the Citizens Directive might be one resulting in a “state of
origin” rule, relying on the law of the place where the marriage
occurred.343 In light of the E.U. legislators’ agreement to leave the issue
to the judiciary, however, he advised that this might require a “case-bycase analysis,” giving each objecting member state an opportunity to
“invoke overriding reasons of general interest in order to deny . . . legal
recognition” of the marriages.344 This proposed piecemeal approach
however would arguably violate the general principle of equal treatment
of E.U. citizens from various member states, which in turn would create
legal uncertainty and unnecessary litigation.345
A more holistic approach to balancing E.U. interests and member state
interests may be more appropriate and effective than an individual one.
Focusing on member state law and on the balance between strong individual state policies and the goals of the Union as a whole is not normally
a part of interpreting the text of a directive when no new implied funda341 Id. at 88-89 (listing Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia).
342 See supra Part III(E).
343 Koen Lenaerts, Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the
European Court of Justice, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1338, 1356, 1360 (2010).
344 Id. at 1360-61.
345 Jorrit Rijpma & Nelleke Koffeman, Chapter 20 - Free Movement Rights for
Same-Sex Couples Under EU Law: What Role to Play for the CJEU?, in SAME-SEX
COUPLES BEFORE NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS
455, 471-72 (Daniele Gallo et al. eds., 2014).
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mental right is asserted. Yet it may be a wise exercise here, especially in
the interest of institutional legitimacy.
The Union’s interests include protecting families and establishing a uniform interpretation of the Family Migration Directives, including the
word “spouse,” and the freedom of citizens and legal residents to migrate
within the E.U. without having to leave their families behind. The Union
also aims for E.U. law to be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner
on the basis of sex or sexual orientation. The primary interest of the
member states, on the other hand, is to maintain family laws that reflect
their particular cultural norms and prevent any erosion of their primary
jurisdiction over family law through the route of harmonized E.U. migration policy.
As the diagram below illustrates, there is only one type of rule that
balances the institutional interests of the Union and member states in the
two-tiered E.U. system: a generalized version of a state-of-origin rule like
that suggested by Vice President Lenaerts. An independent new Unionwide definition of marriage, whether a D.O.M.A.-style different-sex definition of marriage or an independent definition of “spouse” that includes
same-sex couples, would subvert every member state’s primary competence for determining familial status. The choice-of-law rules, however,
would respect one or both member states’ authority over family law
(depending on whether they coincide or conflict).
A choice of the host state’s law clearly fails to meet the E.U.’s goal of
uniform interpretation of the Family Migration Directives. Under that
rule, the directives would mean something different with regard to the
same couple depending on the host member state. For example, if a
Spanish man married an Argentinean man in Spain, the Spaniard would
have a right under the Citizens Directive to bring his husband with him if
he moved to France, but not if he moved to Cyprus. This coerced choice
between member states has been long rejected under E.U. law and again
in the Family Migration Directives.346 This is the European equivalent of
the situation that troubled the U.S. Supreme Court and led it to strike
down the definition section of D.O.M.A. in United States v. Windsor.347
Respects some Member
State’s family law
Establishes uniformity Definition of Home Member
State (Member State of
Celebration or Nationality)
Does not establish
uniformity

346
347

Does not respect any
Member State’s family law
Autonomous E.U.
Definition

Definition of Host Member
State

See supra Part IV(C).
See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
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As shown in the diagram above, the only option that results in both
uniformity throughout the Union and respect for member states’
competence over familial status is a choice-of-law rule based on either the
member-state-of-origin or the home-member-state — that is, the
member-state-of-celebration or the member-state-of-nationality. Under
this rule, the couple described above would be entitled to immigrate to
any E.U. country, while also respecting the Spanish family law.
A focus on the state-of-celebration might sometimes mean that a
lesbian Cypriot could marry in Spain and then claim a right to sponsor
her wife under the Citizens Directive in Cyprus.348 That possibility would
be eliminated by a choice-of-law rule based on the sponsor’s member
state of nationality (or legal residence, in the case of the Family
Reunification Directive), but such a rule could lead to the sort of
discrimination on the basis of nationality that has been anathema under
E.U. law for decades.349
The E.U. member-state-of-celebration rule described above is
somewhat more limited than the place-of-celebration rule followed in the
United States. To the extent that it includes marriages celebrated outside
of the Union, a place-of-celebration rule would not fulfill the same
balancing interest regarding member state competence for family law.
Yet the textual, systematic and teleological arguments would still support
a place-of-celebration rule, and such a rule would also provide unified
Union-wide treatment.
CONCLUSION
In the context of family-based immigration, the E.U. and its Family
Migration Directives are far ahead of the U.S. and its immigration laws in
recognizing partnerships, informal couples, and other important relationships. Yet the implementation of the directives has been inconsistent
throughout the Union, particularly with the treatment of same-sex
spouses, compromising its goal of creating a “Union without borders”
and its longstanding principles of uniformity and autonomy, freedom of
movement, and family reunification.
In the area of marriage, on the other hand, the E.U. has fallen behind
and stands at a crossroads closely resembling one faced by the U.S. back
348 See, e.g., Ordinanza del Trib. di Reggio Emilia (civil law section), sez. I civ.,
1401/2011 (13 February 2012) (recognizing Spanish marriage of Italian citizen in Italy
under the Citizens Directive); but see F.R.A. REPORT, supra note 1, at 82 (describing
a Cyprus Supreme Court decision finding no current obligation to recognize such a
marriage).
349 Titia Loenen, Indirect Discrimination: Oscillating Between Containment and
Revolution, in NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 195, 196
(Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodrigues, eds., 1999) (noting that the E.C.J. views
“discrimination on the basis of nationality” as “the ultimate sin” in the context of
interstate movement within Europe).
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in 2013, when the Supreme Court struck down the definition of “spouse”
in the Defense of Marriage Act. Some E.U. member states recognize
same-sex marriage and registered partnerships while others do not. With
varying member state definitions of the term “spouse,” the E.C.J. (or the
E.U. legislator) eventually will have to resolve disputes among home
member states and host member states when married binational same-sex
couples migrate from one state to another. Like U.S. decision makers
before it, the E.C.J. will face several options: an autonomous E.U. definition of “spouse” or a choice-of-law rule selecting the definition of either
the host member state, the place or member state of celebration, or the
member state of nationality.350
An autonomous E.U. definition of “spouse” that excludes legally married same-sex couples would be inconsistent and unsupported by nearly
all of the approaches above, and it is highly unlikely to occur. Under the
teleological and comparative approaches, such an autonomous definition
would no longer be appropriate in an E.U. where a rapidly increasing
number of member states are recognizing same-sex marriage for general
and immigration purposes. Nor would it be consistent with the broader
E.U. principles of free movement, respect for family, and nondiscrimination. It would also subvert the laws of member states that do recognize
same-sex marriage. Moreover, it would be inconsistent with the most
faithful textual and systematic interpretations of the Family Migration
Directives.
Historical analysis of the Family Migration Directives may lend some
support to such a restrictive reading of “spouse,” but it would not be conclusive. If the legislative intent behind the directives was to refuse recognition to same-sex spouses, the directives are poorly drafted to effectuate
this intent. At least in the case of the Citizens Directive, there was no
clear “meeting of the minds” among members of the Parliament, the
Council, and the Commission. Instead, the legislative history as a whole
reflects the legislators’ willingness to agree to disagree on the contentious
definition of “spouse.”
An autonomous E.U. definition of “spouse” that includes same-sex
couples would be fully supported by the textual, systematic, and teleological analyses above. The texts of the two directives and the normative
system under which they operate rely on a broad meaning of “spouse,”
which even addresses marriages expressly rejected from their coverage.
In the general texts, “spouse” has no modifiers or conditions, and if there
are no express exceptions, the E.U. directives should not be read restrictively. The inclusive, autonomous definition also would support the goals
of free movement and family reunification as well as the principles of
uniformity and nondiscrimination in the directives and the treaties upon
which they are based.
350

See supra Part II(B).
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However, a rule respecting the family law of the member state where
the marriage was celebrated might serve those goals even better. Similarly supported by the textual, systematic and teleological approaches
above, a member-state-of-celebration rule would respect member states’
interests and governance of family law, better comporting with the
Union-member state balance suggested in Part IV(D)(2) above.
Although a member-state-of-nationality rule would also strike this balance, it would raise serious problems with discrimination on the bases of
nationality, sex, and sexual orientation, all prevalent concerns of the E.U.
Alternatively, an autonomous definition recognizing same-sex spouses
might be required under these non-discrimination requirements as well as
European fundamental rights regarding family and family formation.351
Except as relevant under the “harmonious interpretation” principle,352
however, that discussion is beyond this paper’s focus on legislative
interpretation.
As forewarned at the outset, this rigorous academic exercise does not
accurately reflect the E.C.J.’s practice of directive interpretation. A real
case will come with real facts and real emotional, national, and institutional concerns. It is difficult to say which of the methods and arguments
the E.C.J. will employ and find persuasive. However, this comprehensive
analysis demonstrates that the best possible E.C.J. interpretations of the
term “spouse” in the Family Migration Directives would be an inclusive,
autonomous E.U. definition of “spouse” or a place- or member-state-ofcelebration rule. In the end, the success of a place-of-celebration rule in
the United States and recent U.S. Supreme Court caselaw may augur well
for the future recognition of same-sex spouses in Europe.
351
352

See supra Parts IV(A)(3) & IV(C).
See supra Part III(B).

